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INTERPRETING THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE: METHODOLOGIES 
USED, MISUSED AND UNUSED 
Howard Foss* 
I. INTERPRETING THE CODE 
A. METHODOLOGIES FOR INTERPRETING THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 
There are two contrasting methodologies for interpreting 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. l They reflect disa-
greement as to both the source of the law and the technique to 
be used in interpreting Code provisions. One approach, referred 
to herein as the "intra-Code" methodology, treats the U.C.C. as 
a self-contained whole and requires that the answers to interpre-
tive questions must be found within the Code itself.2 Under this 
• A.S. 1968, Harvard College; J.D. 1973, University of California at Berkeley; Pro-
fessor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. 
1. The Uniform Commercial Code is hereinafter referred to as the Code or the 
U.C.C. For simplicity, references and citations herein are to U.C.C. sections rather than to 
their state law counterparts. State law is noted where it differs from the U.C.C. 
2. Professor Grant Gilmore explained the concept of a code as a self-contained 
whole in the following manner: 
A "statute," let us say, is a legislative enactment which goes a8 
far as it goes and no further: that is to say, when a case arises 
which is not within the precise statutory language, which 
reveals a gap in the statutory scheme or a situation not fore-
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intra-Code methodology the primary technique is to interpret 
provisions according to the relevant purposes and policies found 
within the Code.s The interpretation most consistent with the 
purposes of a Code provision or with the general purposes of the 
Code will prevail. A secondary intra-Code technique is to inter-
pret each provision so that it is consistent with other provisions 
of the Code." 
At the other end of the spectrum is the "extra-Code" meth-
odology, which permits the V.C.C. to be interpreted with free 
general area covered by the statute), then the court should put 
the statute out of mind and reason its way to decision accord-
ing to the basic principles of the common law. A "code," let us 
say, is a legislative enactment which entirely pre-empts the 
field and which is assumed to carry within it the answers to all 
possible questions: thus when a court comes to a gap or an 
unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, by extrapolation and 
analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying 
law; the pre-Code common law is no longer available as an au-
thoritative source. We may take another, subsidiary distinc-
tion between "statute" and "code." When a "statute," having 
been in force for a time, has been interpreted in a series of 
judicial opinions, those opinions themselves become part of 
the statutory complex: the meaning of the statute must now 
be sought not merely in the statutory text but in the statute 
plus the cases that have been decided under it. A "code," on 
the other hand, remains at all times its own best evidence of 
what it means: cases decided under it may be interesting, per-
suasive, cogent, but each new case must be referred for deci-
sion to the undefiled code text. 
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961). 
3. In intra-Code methodology a distinction should be drawn between the source of 
interpretation, which is the U.C.C. itself, and the interpretive technique employed. Sev-
eral techniques are possible utilizing the wisdom embodied in the Code. The most com-
monly employed technique has been to interpret according to the relevant purposes and 
policies. See infra notes 27-108 and accompanying text. The natural affinity between the 
technique of purpose reasoning and the source of the Code has been noted: 
Under the true code approach, then, a court should look no 
further than the code itself for solution to disputes governed 
by it-its purposes and policies should dictate the result even 
where there is no express language on point. Problems in in-
terpreting code language not defined within the code explicitly 
also would be resolved by reference to the Code's purposes 
and policies. 
Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and 
"Code" Methodology, 18. B.C. L. REV. 655, 657 (1977). 
4. In some decisions reviewed herein, courts have justified their interpretation on 
the ground that one Code provision expressly determines the interpretation of another. 
Other courts have held that implications from one or more Code provisions determine 
the interpretation of another. See infra notes 109-158 and accompanying text. 
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recourse to outside, non-Code law.1I The extra-Code approach, 
rather than proceeding from sources within the Code, empha-
sizes the importance of common laws and statutory law7 as pri-
5. For example, non-Code law has been used to change rights and priorities other-
wise created by Article 9 of the Code. In T & 0 Mobile Homes, Inc. v. United California 
Bank, 40 Cal. 3d 441, 220 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1985), the California Supreme Court applied 
principles of real property law to change the result otherwise applicable under Article 9 
in a priority dispute between the buyer of a motor home and a secured party therein. See 
infra notes 180-187 and accompanying text. In Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar 
Corp., 197 Cal. App. 3d 638, 242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1988), the California Court of Appeal 
applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment to change the priorities otherwise applicable 
under Article 9 between a buyer of goods and a secured party. See infra notes 209-212 
and accompanying text. 
6. Professor Gilmore opined that the common law is an appropriate source of law 
for interpreting the U.C.C. 
Surely the principle function of a Code is to abolish the past. 
At least a common lawyer assumes that that was the theory on 
which the great civil law codes were based. From the date of 
the Code's enactment, the pre-Code law is no longer available 
as a source of law. The gaps, the ambiguities, the unforeseen 
situations cannot be referred for decision to the accumulated 
wisdom of the past. There is a fresh start, a new universe of 
legal discourse, in which the only permissible way of solving a 
problem is to find (or pretend to find) the answer in the un-
defiled, the unconstrued, the uncontaminated text of the Code 
itself. How well the theory worked in practice, or whether it 
worked at all, you, as civilians, are much better equipped to 
say than I. The Uniform Commercial Code, so-called, is not 
that sort of Code-even in theory. It derives from the common 
law, not the civil law, tradition. We shall do better to think of 
it as a big statute-or a collection of statutes bound together 
in the same book-which goes as far as it goes and no further. 
It assumes the continuing existence of a large body of pre-
Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support, which it 
displaces to the least possible extent, and without which it 
could not survive. The solid stuff of pre-Code law will furnish 
the rationale of decision quite as often as the Code's own gos-
samer substance. 
Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1966) 
7. Extra-Code statutory law has been applied to resolve a matter left unresolved by 
the Code. In SCT, USA, Inc. v. Mitsui Manufacturers Bank, 155 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 202 
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1984), the California Court of Appeal employed California Code of Civil 
Procedure § 12, which provides that the "time in which any act provided by law is to be 
done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last," to compute the five-
year effective period of a financing statement under U.C.C. § 9-403(2). See infra notes 
171-175 and accompanying text. Such a resort to extra-Code statutory law is untroubling 
because § 9-403(2) does not resolve the computation issue. On the other hand, it would 
be more troublesome if statutory law were held to supersede the U.C.C. on an issue to 
which the U.C.C. speaks. Thus, in Nunes Turfgrass, Inc. v. Vaughn-Jacklin Seed Co., 
Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518, 246 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1988), the California Court of Appeal 
refused to supersede U.C.C. § 2-719 with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668. Both sections deal with 
contractual limitations on damages, but the U.C.C. provision was held to be applicable to 
3
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mary sources in resolving doubtful cases under the Code. Under 
this approach outside law can be used to create an exception to 
a Code provision8 or to supersede a Code provision.9 The extra-
Code approach is premised on the notion that the Code drafters 
could not foresee all possible contingencies and that courts, be-
ing better able to take account of the factors in a particular case, 
should recognize and cure unfairness in the application of a 
Code provision by applying non-Code law.1o 
The U.C.C. authorizes both intra-Code methodology and ex-
tra-Code methodology. The intra-Code approach, with its em-
phasis on reasoning from purpose and policy, finds support in 
section 1-102(1), which provides: 
This Act shall be liberally construed and applied 
to promote its underlying purposes and policies. l1 
the exclusion of the Civil Code provision. See infra notes 176-179 and accompanying 
text. 
8. See, e.g., Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings and Loan Assoc., 804 
F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987), wherein the New York right 
of restitution for mistaken payment creates an exception to the final payment rule of 
U.C.C. § 3-418. 
9. See, e.g., Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Kroesen, 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 184 Cal. 
Rptr. 436 (1982) (common law accord and satisfaction supersedes U.C.C. § 1-207); Citi-
zens Bank of Roseville v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983) (com-
mon law rule supersedes Code regarding rights of lien creditor vis-a-vis cash seller); Joffe 
v. United California Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 541, 190 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1983) (tort negli-
gence rules supersede U.C.C. in action by depositor against depository bank). 
10. The intra-Code reliance on Code sources is undermined by two limitations in-
herent in statutory drafting. First, it is impossible to draft a statute to cover all contin-
gencies. Second, even if the drafters foresaw a contingency, their statutory language may 
be ambiguous. These two factors led one commentator to argue that .extra-Code equita-
ble principles are usually an appropriate source for interpreting the U.C.C. 
Yet the extent to which legislators can write rules to take ac-
count of equity in the particular case is limited. It is not just 
that contingencies are not always foreseeable-it would be 
cumbersome to formulate law even for every foreseeable con-
tingency. In addition, language is imperfect. And legislators, 
unlike judges, are not well-suited to take account of circum-
stantial details that generate equities. 
Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 906, 907 (1978). 
11. U.C.C. § 1-102 not only requires intra-Code purpose reasoning according to un-
derlying purposes and policies, but also defines those underlying purposes and policies 
according to which the Code is to be construed. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2) provides: 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
4
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Not only do the purposes and policies underlying the Code12 
provide interpretive guidance, but also the purposes and policies 
underlying each provision of the Code likewise provide a basis 
for interpretation. The Official Comment to section 1-102 
provides: 
The Act should be construed in accordance with 
its underlying purposes and policies. The text of 
each section should be read in light of the pur-
pose and policy of the rule or principle in ques-
tion, as also of the Act as a whole, and the appli-
cation of the language should be construed 
narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in con-
formity with the purposes and policies involved. 18 
In addition to section 1-102, there are other aspects of the 
Code that lend support for the primacy of intra-Code methodol-
ogy. Recent scholarship indicates that the Code was drafted ac-
cording to a "patent reason" technique to include reason, pur-
pose and policy in each section with the conscious goal that 
Code provisions should be applied and interpreted accordingly. 1. 
In fact, some Code sections are solely policy statements which 
can be used to solve interpretive questions. 111 Even where it was 
12. [d. 
practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions. 
13. Official Comment 1 to § 1·102. This comment also provides that "the proper 
construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its 
reason." [d. 
14. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WMo & 
MARY Lo REV. 341 (1986) [hereinafter, Gedidl. 
15. For example, UoCoCo § 1·106, which adopts the expectation measure of damages 
as the favored measure of damages under the Code, can be used to interpret ambiguities 
in the application of other damages provisions. It can even have a substantive effect of 
its own, as in Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 
209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984), where U.C.Co § 1·106 was held to supersede UoCoCo § 2·713 as 
the measure of damages. See infra notes 47·53 and accompanying text. Section 1·106 
provides: 
§ 1·106. Remedies to be Liberally Administered. 
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally ad· 
ministered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in 
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed 
but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may 
be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other 
rule of law. 
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this Act is enforceable 
5
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inconvenient to draft policy on the face of the statute, such pol-
icy can often be found in the relevant Official Comments. Thus, 
the comments are an important aspect of the patent reason de-
vice, because they provide the reason, policy and purpose neces-
sary for interpreting Code provisions under the intra-Code 
methodology. IS 
On the other hand the extra-Code approach finds ample 
support in the Code as well. Section 1-103 provides: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of 
this Act, the principles of law and equity, includ-
ing the law merchant and the law relative to ca-
pacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mis-
take, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidat-
ing cause shall supplement its provisions.17 
This section instructs courts to apply extra-Code principles 
unless such law is "displaced" by the Code. Therefore, where ex-
tra-Code principles are not displaced, courts are to use them. 
Conversely, where extra-Code principles are displaced by the 
Code, courts may not use them. Unfortunately, the Code does 
not explain when an extra-Code principle is displaced and when 
it is not. 
B. EXAMPLES OF INTERPRETIVE DISPUTES 
Numerous types of interpretive disputes have arisen 
wherein the choice of interpretive methodology can affect the re-
sult. For example, the parties might dispute whether a particular 
Code provision applies to their dispute. I8 If the court is recep-
by action unless the provision declaring it specifies a different 
and limited effect. 
16. See Gedid, supra note 14, at 382-83. 
17. To the same effect is Official Comment 1 to u.c.c. § 1-103, which provides that 
section 1-103 "indicates the continued applicability to commercial contracts of all sup-
plemental bodies of law except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this 
Act .... tt 
18. See, e.g., In re Pacific Trencher, 735 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1984) (issue of whether 
U.C.C. § 9-402(8) applies or whether extra-Code doctrine of reformation for mistake pre-
empts it); T & 0 Mobile Homes, Inc. v. United California Bank, 40 Cal. 3d 441, 220 Cal. 
Rptr. 627 (1985) (issue of whether Article 9 priority scheme applies against buyer of 
6
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tive to extra-Code methodology, it is more likely to hold that an 
appealing principle of extra-Code law supersedes the Code pro-
vision than if the court reasons according to intra-Code method-
ology. A related interpretive problem occurs where the parties 
dispute whether one of them is entitled to an exception to an 
otherwise applicable Code provision. The party urging an excep-
tion might prevail if the court will use extra-Code law such as 
fraud, mistake or estoppel to create the exception, whereas such 
party might lose if the court reasons solely from within the Code 
according to the logic of the Code and the purposes of the Code 
provisions involved.19 
An example of such a situation might be found in an oral 
contract for the sale of goods where the seller sues the buyer and 
the buyer defends on the ground that the statute of frauds20 is 
not satisfied. Assume that the buyer represented to the seller 
that the buyer would perform, and in reliance thereon the seller 
missed resale opportunities that are now permanently lost be-
cause the goods have spoiled.21 Under extra-Code methodology, 
it might be possible to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
to create an extra-Code exception to the statute of frauds. The 
buyer would thereby be estopped from asserting the statute of 
frauds because of the buyer's promise to the seller.22 On the 
other hand, under intra-Code methodology, the result in this 
motor horne where filing officer omitted indication of security interest on certificate of 
title); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Price, 163 Cal. App. 3d 745, 210 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1985) 
(issue of whether notice requirements of CAL. COM. CODE § 9504(3) apply or whether 
substantial compliance is sufficient). 
19. Examples of cases where courts have used extra-Code law to create exceptions to 
Code provisions are: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings and Loan Assoc., 
804 F. 2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987) (common law 
restitutionary remedy held to be an exception to § 3-418 final payment rule); Allied 
Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1988) 
(non-Code promissory estoppel held an exception to § 2-201 statute of frauds); Produc-
ers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp., 197 Cal. App. 3d 638, 242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1988) 
(unjust enrichment held to create exception to priorities otherwise dictated by Article 9). 
20. U.C.C. § 2-201, infra note 189. 
21. These facts are suggested by Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. 
App. 3d 432, 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1988). 
22. Courts in other jurisdictions using extra-Code methodology have applied the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel as an exception to the statutue of frauds. See, e.g., At-
lantic Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Solondz, 320 S.E. 2d 720 (S.C. App. 1984); Northwest Potato 
Sales, Inc. v. Beck, 208 Mont. 310, 678 P. 2d 1138 (1984); Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 56 
Ore. App. 254, 641 P. 2d 628 (1982); Ralston Purina Co. v. McCollum, 611 S.W. 2d 201 
(Ark. App. 1981). See generally, Metzger and Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 
2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 63'(1980). 
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case would be to bar the seller because the Code's statute of 
frauds for goods is not otherwise satisfied and contains no excep-
tion for promissory estoppel. 23 
In another type of interpretive dispute, the parties might 
disagree over which of two conflicting Code provisions applies to 
their dispute. 24 In this situation one Code provision is more 
favorable to the plaintiff and the other Code provision more 
favorable to defendant. If the court chooses according to which 
provision better comports with a favored extra-Code principle, a 
different result may be had than if the choice is made by resort 
to the internal logic of the Code and the purpose of the relevant 
provisions. 
Another type of interpretive problem involves interpreting 
ambiguities in the meaning of Code provisions. Assuming that a 
Code provision does apply, the parties might dispute what it 
means when applied to the facts of the parties' case. Such ambi-
guities often arise due to definitional gaps or inconclusive draft-
ing.211 Where such ambiguities are interpreted to give a result 
conforming to extra-Code law, the result might differ from an 
interpretation based on conformity with the purpose of the rele-
vant Code provision or with some other Code provision. 
C. THE PROBLEM 
The Code authorizes both intra-Code and extra-Code meth-
odology. The choice of methodology may be an important factor 
in determining the interpretation. Yet the Code does not resolve 
the questions of how to apply these methodologies, whether 
23. The Ninth Circuit reflected this view when it rejected an estoppel exception to 
V.C.C. § 2-201 in C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg·Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977). 
24. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Western Bank, 841 F.2d 1433 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (possible applicability of § 4-213(1) superseded by § 3-418); Allied Canners & 
Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984) (possi· 
ble applicability of § 2-713 superseded by § 1-106). 
25. See, e.g. Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 229 Cal. 
Rptr. 396 (1986) (whether a guarantor is a "debtor" entitled to protections under § 9-
504(3»; In re Black & White Cattle Co., 783 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (what is "commer· 
cially reasonable time" under § 2-402(2»; In re Borba, 736 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(when has a transfer been "concealed" under § 6-111); In re World Financial Services 
Center, Inc. 78 B.R. 239 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (what form of the debtor's name is required 
to satisfy § 9-402(1». 
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courts must choose between them, and if a choice must be made, 
how to choose. Because it is possible to disagree on the answers 
to these questions,26 it is predictable that the courts' approach 
to Code methodology has been uncertain. The purpose of this 
article is to examine the methodologies actually used by the 
courts in construing the U.C.C., to critique that methodology 
and to suggest a methodological approach for the future. The 
cases examined are decided by the Ninth Circuit and the Cali-
fornia courts. 
II. DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 
In interpreting prOVISIons of the U.C.C., the courts have 
used a bewildering array of intra-Code methodology, extra-Code 
methodology, and no articulated methodology at all. In addition, 
26. Commentators have argued various positions along the spectrum running from 
pure intra-Code methodology to pure extra-Code methodology. For example, Professor 
Gedid has recently argued for the intra-Code approach. He argues that Karl Llewellyn's 
understanding of the judicial process led him to exert his great influence to cause the 
V.C.C. to be drafted in Code form. It was Llewellyn'S goal to explain within the Code the 
policy, purpose and reason behind the Code's provisions. Professor Gedid concludes that 
the source of Code interpretation should therefore be from within the Code and the 
technique for interpreting a Code provision should be to consider the purpose of that 
provision and the relationship of that provision to other Code provisions. See Gedid, 
supra note 14. 
Professor Hillman has argued for a modified "true code" approach that permits re-
sort to extra-Code rules where neither Code language nor Code purposes and policies are 
useful. This approach, while still favoring intra-Code interpretation, is positioned along 
the spectrum at a point closer to extra-Code methodology than the methodology favored 
by Professor Gedid. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Sec-
tion 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. L. REV. 655 (1977) [hereinafter, Hillman]. 
Professor Nickles takes a position in the middle of the spectrum. He argues that, 
because neither approach is ideally suited to interpreting the U.C.C., courts should have 
the option either to use common law principles or to reason from within the U.C.C. based 
on purposes and analogies to other V.C.C. provisions. Whichever approach is taken, how-
ever, must be consistent with the purposes of the U.C.C. expressed in § 1-102(2). Nickles, 
Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code -Part 
II: The English Method and Solution to the Methodological Problem, 31 ARK. L. REV. 
171 (1977) [hereinafter, Nickles]. 
Professor Summers has taken a position closer to the end of the spectrum repre-
sented by extra-code methodology. He recommends giving great weight to common law 
equitable principles to supplement, modify and explain V.C.C. provisions. Vnder his ap-
proach common law equitable principles are available not only to fill gaps created by 
Code silence, but also to modify and create exceptions to Code provisions. Summers, 
General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 
Nw. V.L. REV. 906, 934-35 (1978). 
9
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the courts have failed to articulate a standard for electing which 
methodology to apply. 
A. INTRA-CODE METHODOLOGY 
Courts have employed numerous intra-Code techniques. 
Some courts have adopted an interpretation because such inter-
pretation advances the purpose of the interpreted provision. 
Similarly, courts have rejected interpretations which are at odds 
with the purpose of the interpreted provision. Courts have also 
used the intra-Code technique of interpreting one Code provi-
sion by resort to other Code provisions. Sometimes such other 
Code provisions are held expressly to resolve interpretive ques-
tions. In other instances, Code provisions resolve interpretive 
questions by implication. The following are examples of these 
techniques. 
1. Interpretation To Advance Purpose of Provision 
The pattern of reasoning in these cases can be described 
summarily. The court establishes the purpose of the provision27 
and then determines whether an arguable interpretation is in 
harmony with that purpose. If so, the court adopts the interpre-
tation as the law of the case. Using such reasoning, courts have 
filled in definitional gaps, interpreted ambiguous provisions, and 
chosen between conflicting provisions. 
27. A court need not expressly state the purpose of the interpreted provision in or-
der to reason from that purpose. Purpose reasoning may proceed from the unstated pur-
pose of the provision. For example, in In re World Financial Services Center, Inc., 78 
B.R. 239 (9th Cir. BAP 1987), the court used purpose reasoning to fill in a definitional 
gap in U.C.C. § 9-402(1) but did not expressly articulate the purpose of the provision. 
Section 9-402(1) provides that a proper financing statement must contain the name of 
the debtor, but does not elaborate on the name required. Although not expressly articu-
lated by the court, the purpose of this debtor-name requirement is to protect the subse-
quent creditors by insuring that they can find a financing statement after it has been 
indexed by the name of the debtor appearing thereon. Thus the debtor-name require-
ment should be interpeted to require that the name of the debtor must be indentified in 
the financing statement in such a way that a reasonable search of the recorded financing 
statements would disclose the financing statement. In World Financial Services Center 
the financing statement identified the debtor as "Margaret Howe, dba Bargain Furn/ 
World Finance" whereas the debtor's actual name was "World Financial Servies Center, 
Inc." This language was held not to satisfy § 9-402(1) because the financing statement 
would not be found by subsequent creditors due to the faulty debtor name. [d. at 242. 
10
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In Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County,28 the California 
Court of Appeal used such purpose reasoning to fill in a defini-
tional gap in the Code regarding the question of whether a guar-
antor should be treated as a "debtor" under Article 9, thereby 
giving the guarantor the protections of a debtor. Such protec-
tions include the right of the debtor to receive notice of a sale of 
collateral by the secured party29 and a prohibition against the 
debtor's pre-default waiver of its right to such notice.30 It is un-
clear from the Code whether a guarantor is a debtor entitled to 
28. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1986). 
29. The secured party must notify the debtor of the intended disposition of collat-
eral. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) provides: 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private 
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more con-
tracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels 
and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect 
of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place, 
and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral 
is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a 
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable noti-
fication of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable 
notification of the time after which any private sale or other 
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured 
party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a state-
ment renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. 
In the case of consumer goods no other notification need be 
sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other se-
cured party from whom the secured party has received (before 
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's 
renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an in-
terest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any 
public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in 
a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of 
widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at 
private sale. 
In California, if the secured party fails to give the required notice, the secured party 
is barred from recovering a deficiency judgment from the debtor. Barber v. LeRoy, 40 
Cal. App. 3d 336, 344, 115 Cal. Rptr. 272, 277-78 (1974). Some jurisdictions have taken a 
different view of such secured party non-compliance and have in such circumstances im-
posed on the secured party a rebuttable presumption that the value of the collateral is 
equal to the debt. See Foss, The Noncomplying Secured Party's Right to a Deficiency, 
21 U.C.C. L. J. 226 (1989). 
30. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) imposes the notice requirement only where the debtor "has not 
signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of 
sale." U.C.C. § 9-501(3) provides that such protection from pre-default waiver may not be 
waived: 
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose 
duties on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections 
referred to below may not be waived or varied .... [followed 
by reference to § 9-504(3»)" 
11
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such protection, because the term "debtor" is not defined with 
reference to the term guarantor.31 The Connolly court held that 
a guarantor is a debtor entitled to the foregoing debtor's protec-
tions, and grounded its result on advancing the purpose of the 
debtor-protective provisions.32 Reasoning with regard to the no-
tice requirement, the court determined that the purpose of the 
notice requirement is to protect the obligor from potentialliabil-
ity for a deficiency judgment by giving the obligor an opportu-
nity to bid at the sale and by preserving the obligor's right to 
redeem the collateral. 33 Once the guarantor becomes the likely 
primary obligor and the likely target of the creditor (i.e., upon 
the debtor's default), the purpose of the notice requirement is 
best served by treating the guarantor as a debtor entitled to 
such notice. As the primary obligor, the guarantor's interest in 
receiving notice of sale is at least as great as the debtor's.34 The 
same reasoning applies to the anti-waiver provision. Once its 
debtor-protective purpose applies to the guarantor, the guaran-
tor should be treated as a debtor entitled to its protections.311 
Two subsequent decisions of the California courts have em-
braced the Connolly reasoning.36 
Courts have used purpose reasoning to interpret ambiguities 
in Code provisions.37 An example of such an ambiguous provi-
31. V.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) defines the term "debtor" as follows: 
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other per-
formance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or 
has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts 
or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of the col-
lateral are not the same person, the term "debtor" means the 
owner of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing 
with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with 
the obligation, and may include both where the context so 
requires; 
32. Connolly, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1124-25, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400. 
33. Id. at 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 399. 
34. Id. at 1124-25, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 399. 
35. Id. at 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 400. 
36. American National Bank v. Perm a-Tile Roof Co., 200 Cal. App. 3d 889, 246 Cal. 
Rptr. 381 (1988); C.I.T. Corp. v. Anwright Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 237 Cal. Rptr. 
108 (1987). Another California decision held that a guarantor is not a debtor for pur-
poses of the prohibition against pre-default waiver. Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc., 173 
Cal. App. 3d 965, 219 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1985). This court did not disclose its reasoning but 
simply cited one case from another jurisdiction. See infra notes 224-227 and accompany-
ing text. 
37. For example, the facts of Procyon Corp. v. Components Direct, Inc., 203 Cal. 
App. 3d 409, 249 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1988), create an ambiguity in § 2-201(2), the Code's 
12
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sion is section 5·114(2)(b),38 under which the issuer of a letter of 
statute of frauds for goods, infra note 189. That section provides that a written confir-
mation of a contract which is "sufficient against the sender" will satisfy the requirements 
of the statute of frauds against the recipient of a confirmation, if the recipient does not 
give written notice of objection to the confirmation within ten days after it is received. 
Thus, if a seller of goods fails to deliver, the statute of frauds ordinarily would require 
the plaintiff buyer to produce a writing signed by the seller to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. However, if the buyer sends a written confirmation to the seller and that writing 
is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds against the buyer, then under § 2-201(2) the 
buyer may use the same confirmation to satisfy the statute of frauds against the seller. 
In the Procyon case, the issue was whether a letter of credit issued by the buyer's bank 
at the buyer's request and delivered to the seller satisfied the statute of frauds against 
the buyer, so as to be "sufficient against the sender" under § 2-201(2). If so, the buyer 
could use the letter of credit to satisfy the statute of frauds against the seller. Procyon 
Corp. had a contract to purchase computer chips from Components. In order to assure 
itself that Procyon would be bound to the contract, Components had required that Pro-
cyon procure a letter of credit in favor of Components. Procyon's bank issued a letter of 
credit which included the contract terms. When Components failed to deliver, Procyon 
sued for breach of oral contract. Components defended on the ground that, because 
Components had not signed any contract, the statute of frauds precluded Procyon from 
suing for a breach. 
The Court of Appeal held that the letter of credit was "sufficient against the sender" 
under § 2-201(2). The Court of Appeal justified its broad interpretation of "sufficient 
against the sender" by resort to two of the purposes of § 2-201(2). According to the 
court, one purpose of that section is to expedite confirmation of oral contracts among 
commercial traders. [d. at 412, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 816. A second purpose is to equalize the 
position of both sides and avoid giving the recipient of a confirmation the advantage of 
being able to watch a fluctuating market knowing he can bind but not be bound. [d. at 
413, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 816. It is apparent that both purposes are served by permitting the 
letter of credit to operate against Procyon under § 2-201(2). The contrary result would 
defeat those purposes by giving Components the advantage of holding Procyon to the 
contract while not being held itself. 
In holding that the letter of credit was "sufficient against the sender" the Court of 
Appeal addressed two problems raised by the facts. First, the letter of credit had not 
been signed by Procyon, as would be required to make the letter of credit sufficient 
against Procyon under § 2-201(1). In reply to this argument the Court of Appeal stated 
that the Bank had acted as Procyon's agent for the letter of credit and that the Bank's 
signature on the letter had been adopted by Procyon. Therefore, based on the broad 
definition of "signed" in § 1-201(39) ("any symbol ... adopted by a ... party ... to 
authenticate a writing"), the Court of Appeal held that Procyon had "signed" the letter 
as required to make the letter of credit sufficient against it. Second, the Court also held 
that the letter of credit contained a sufficient memorial of the contract to satisfy § 2-
201(1). [d. at 413, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16. 
38. U.C.C. § 5-114(2) provides: 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their 
face to comply with the terms of a credit but a required docu-
ment does not in fact conform to the warranties made on ne-
gotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507) or 
of a certificated security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudu-
lent or there is fraud in the transaction: 
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for pay-
ment if honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or other 
holder of the draft or demand which has taken the draft or 
13
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credit may refuse to honor it if "there is fraud in the transac-
tion". The facts of FDIC v. Bank of San Francisc039 demon-
strate the ambiguity in the quoted language. In that case there 
was fraud alleged in the underlying transaction between the cus-
tomer and the beneficiary of the letter of credit.40 The defendant 
issuer refused to honor the letter of credit on the ground that, 
by reason of fraud in the underlying transaction, there was 
"fraud in the transaction" within the meaning of section 5-
114(2)(b).41 However, if "fraud in the transaction" refers to 
fraud in the presentation of the required documents to the is-
suer, rather than fraud in the underlying transaction, then the 
issuer would not have the option under section 5-114(2)(b) to 
dishonor the letter of credit because the documents presented to 
the issuer in FDIC V. Bank of San Francisco were the correct 
and unforged documents. 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted section 5-114(2)(b) so that 
"fraud in the transaction" refers to fraud in the presentation of 
documents to the issuer and not fraud in the underlying deal 
between the customer and the beneficiary. The court reasoned 
that this result advanced an important purpose of letters of 
credit, i.e., to guarantee assured payment to the beneficiary. An 
interpretation that permits an issuer to avoid payment on the 
grounds of fraud in the transaction between the issuer's cus-
tomer and the beneficiary would defeat that purpose and invite 
uncertainty and litigation instead of assured payment.42 
demand under the credit and under circumstances which 
would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an 
appropriate case would make it a person to whom a document 
of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide 
purchaser of a certificated security (Section 8-302); and 
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer act-
ing in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment 
despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or 
other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a 
court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor. 
The distinction between paragraph (a), where the issuer must honor the letter of 
credit, and paragraph (b), where the issuer may refuse to honor the letter of credit, is 
that in the latter situation no innocent third parties would be hurt by the issuer's refusal 
to honor. Official Comment 2 to § 5-114. 
39. 817 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). 
40. [d. at 1397. 
41. [d. at 1399. 
42. [d. The court also reasoned from an extra-Code source. It cited the statement of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016, that "as a matter of sound banking 
14
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In In re Shooting Star Enterprises, Inc."3 the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit interpreted the term "pro-
ceeds" according to the court's view of the purpose of section 9-
306,'" wherein a security interest continues to operate in favor of 
a secured party in the proceeds of collateral. In this case, the 
debtor's trustee in bankruptcy had purported to sell only a so-
called equity portion of the collateral and not the portion of col-
lateral necessary to pay the debt owed to the secured party. The 
trustee argued that the payment received by the trustee for the 
portion of collateral representing the debtor's equity should not 
constitute proceeds of the collateral and that therefore the se-
cured party's interest in such non-proceeds could not continue 
pecause such security interest only continues in proceeds."11 Al-
though proceeds is defined to include "whatever is received" 
when collateral is sold, the court held that the payment for the 
equity portion did not constitute proceeds and could not be 
reached by the secured party. The court justified its narrow in-
terpretation of the term "proceeds" by the admonition of Offi-
cial Comment 3 to section 9-306 prohibiting the secured party 
from a double recovery."s Applying this policy, the court rea-
soned that the secured party was sufficiently protected by its in-
terest in the collateral and that to give the secured party an in-
terest in the receipts for the equity portion might give it a 
double recovery. 
When two Code provisions arguably apply to the same situ-
policy" the issuer "must not be called upon to determine questions of fact or law be-
tween the account party and the beneficiary." [d. 
43. 76 B.R. 154 (9th Cir. BAP 1987). 
44. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) and (2) provide: 
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, ex-
change, collection or other disposition of collateral or pro-
ceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the 
collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to 
a person other than a party to the security agreement. Money, 
checks, deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds". All 
other proceeds are "non-cash proceeds". 
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security in-
terest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or 
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized 
by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, 
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including col-
lections received by the debtor. 
45. Shooting Star Enterprises, 76 B.R. at 156. 
46. [d. at 157. 
15
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ation, and they lead to different or contradictory results,· a court 
must interpret which provision governs. Using purpose reasoning 
the California Court of Appeal recently made such an interpre-
tation in Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co;n 
Section 2-71348 establishes that the measure of damages for an 
aggrieved buyer is the difference between the market price of 
the goods and the contract price. On the other hand, section 1-
10649 provides that remedies are to be administered to the end 
that "the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if 
the other party had fully performed". These two provisions con-
flicted on the facts of the Allied Canners case. Damages under 
section 2-713 would have been approximately $150,000 whereas 
the actual loss suffered by the aggrieved buyer (and therefore 
the amount necessary to put the buyer in the same position as 
performance under section 1-106) was only $4,462.50.110 The dif-
ference occurred because the buyer had a resale contract for the 
goods on which, because its forward buyer declined to sue it for 
breach, it lost only the smaller amount, whereas the market 
value of the goods exceeded the contract price by the larger 
amount. 
The Court of Appeal analyzed the purpose behind each pro-
vision to determine which provision should govern. Unfortu-
nately, this reasoning disclosed that the purposes of the two sec-
tions were in opposition. The purpose of section 2-713 is to 
disregard the buyer's actual loss, thereby disregarding the actual 
amount necessary to make the buyer whole, and instead to pro-
vide a convenient mechanism based on market value for liqui-
dating the buyer's damages. III On the other hand, the purpose of 
section 1-106 is expressly to put the aggrieved party "in as good 
a position as if the other party had performed" and accomplish-
47. 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984). 
48. U.C.C. § 2-713(1) provides: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to 
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages 
for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference 
between the market price at the time when the buyer learned 
of the breach and the contract price together with any inci-
dental and consequential damages provided in this Article 
(Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the 
seller's breach. 
49. See U.C.C. § 1-106, supra note 15. 
50. Allied Canners, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 64. 
51. [d. at 912-14, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65. 
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ing that purpose requires an award of the actual damages in-
curred rather than a convenient substitute such as market value 
damages. 1I2 The court applied section 1-106 in preference to sec-
tion 2-713, although it did not articulate why the policy of the 
former prevails over the policy of the latter, and held that the 
buyer was entitled only to the lesser amount of damages. liS 
2. Interpretation Where Purpose of Provision Inapplicable 
In this situation, the purpose of the Code provision would 
neither be advanced nor contradicted by its application to the 
facts of the case. Despite the seeming neutrality of this situa-
tion, courts have interpreted Code provisions to be inapplicable 
where the purpose of the provision appears aimed at circum-
stances different from those before the court. There is no need 
to apply the Code provision in such circumstances. 
For example, in Nevada National Leasing Co. v. Herefordll4 
the California Supreme Court held inapplicable the "forced 
sale" provision of section 2-328(4).1111 Under section 2-328(4) the 
buyer at an auction for the sale of goods is generally protected 
from undisclosed bidding by a seller of the auctioned goods, but 
an exception to this rule is applied in the case of a "forced sale." 
Because the term "forced sale" is not defined in the U.C.C., the 
court had to interpret its applicability to the facts of the case. 
The court reasoned from the purpose of the forced sale excep-
tion. That purpose is to give the seller the mechanism of undis-
closed bidding in order for the seller to avoid the unfair, low 
prices often received by sellers in a distress sale environment.1I8 
On the facts of Nevada National Leasing Co., where the owner 
of leased equipment decided to auction it off after two lessees 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 915, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 66. 
54. 36 Cal. 3d 146, 203 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1984). 
55. V.C.C. § 2-328(4) provides: 
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's 
behalf or the seller makes or procures such a bid, and notice 
has not been given that liberty for such bidding is reserved, 
the buyer may at his option avoid the sale or take the goods at 
the price of the last good faith bid prior to the completion of 
the sale. This subsection shall not apply to any bid at a forced 
sale. 
56. Nevada National Leasing, 36 Cal. 3d at 152, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 121. 
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had defaulted,1I7 this purpose was inapplicable because the seller 
voluntarily conducted the sale, could have made alternative ar-
rangements for disposing of the equipment, and was protected 
from an unfair price in any event because the auction was con-
ducted "with reserve."118 In addition the sale was not the execu-
tion sale typically associated with unfairly low prices. Because 
the purpose of the forced sale exception did not apply, the court 
held the forced sale exception inapplicable.1I9 
Another example of the inapplicability of a Code provision 
based on the inapplicability of its purpose can be found in Se-
curity Pacific Bank v. Geernaert.60 There the court created an 
exception to the requirement under section 9-504(3)61 that the 
secured party must notify the debtor concerning the sale of col-
lateral. The purpose of the notice requirement is to guarantee 
fairness in the resale, but in Geernaert such fairness was auto-
matically guaranteed without requiring the secured party to no-
tify the debtor of the sale, because a court-ordered receiver con-
ducted the sale. The reason for the notice requirement not being 
present, an exception to such requirement was created for the 
situation where collateral is sold by a court-ordered receiver.62 
Courts sometimes disagree as to the inapplicability of the 
purpose of a Code provision. When this happens, those courts 
may reach conflicting conclusions and results. One such conflict 
recently arose regarding California's variation of section 5_114.63 
57. Id. at 148, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 119. 
58. Id. at 152-53, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. 
59. Id. at 153, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 122. 
60. 199 Cal. App. 3d 1425, 245 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1988). 
61. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) supra note 29. The California version differs, although the dif-
ferences are not relevant in the context of Security Pacific Bank v. Geernaert. See CAL. 
COM. CODE § 9504(3), infra notes 85 and 86. 
62. Geernaert, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 1431, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16. 
63. The Uniform Commercial Code and the California Commercial Code conflict on 
the question of whether a court may enjoin the honor of a letter of credit. U.C.C. § 5-
114(2)(b) provides: . 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their 
face to comply with the terms of a credit but a required docu-
ment does not in fact conform to the warranties made on ne-
gotiation or transfer of a document title (Section 7-507) or of a 
certificated security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent 
or there is fraud in the transaction: 
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting 
18
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California intentionally prohibits courts from enJommg the 
honor of a letter of credit. The question arose whether the Cali-
fornia version, although generally preventing courts from en-
joining the honor of a letter of credit, could be interpreted as 
subject to an exception that a court may enjoin the beneficiary 
of a letter of credit from seeking payment even though the court 
could not enjoin the issuer from paying. Although the practical 
effect of enjoining the beneficiary is the same as enjoining the 
issuer (i.e., no payment under the letter of credit), the California 
Court of Appeal in Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Texas Com-
merce Bank-Fort Worth84 held that a lower court could enjoin 
the beneficiary from seeking payment. The court reasoned that 
the purpose of the California version of section 5-114 is inappli-
cable where the beneficiary is enjoined. The purpose is disclosed 
in the California Code Comment to section 5-114, namely that 
in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment de-
spite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or other 
defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a court 
of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor. 
On the other hand California Commercial Code § 5114(2)(b) reads identically except for 
the deletion of the phrase "but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such 
honor." The purpose for the California deletion is stated in California Code Comment 6: 
The phrase "but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin 
such honor," which appears at the end of subdivision 2(b) of 
the 1962 Official Text is omitted. 
This provision for a protective injunction was omitted 
because: 
"By giving the courts power to enjoin the honor of drafts 
drawn upon documents which appear to be regular on their 
face, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws do violence to 
one of the basic concepts of the letter of credit, to wit, that the 
letter of credit agreement is independent of the underlying 
commercial transaction. . . ." 
The reasons for this change in the California version are 
stated even more strongly by the State Bar Committee: 
"The State Bar Committee and the Advisory Committee 
believe this part of section 15114 [5114] would undermine the 
parties' basic understanding of a letter of credit transaction, 
namely that the seller is assured of payment upon tender of 
the called for documents, and that the buyer must sue the 
seller in his own country for any claimed breach of contract. 
To permit a court to enjoin the honor of the draft would throw 
the burden on the seller of litigating in the buyer's country 
whenever the buyer raised a claim of 'fraud'. For this reason, 
this provision is contrary to one of the basic concepts of the 
letter of credit: its independence of the underlying commercial 
transaction. . . ." 
64. 159 Cal. App. 3d 1051, 206 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1984). 
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the "power to enjoin the honor of drafts drawn upon documents 
which appear to be regular on their face" does "violence to one 
of the basic concepts of the letter of credit, to wit, that the letter 
of credit agreement is independent of the underlying commercial 
transaction."61i The purpose of the California version is thus to 
protect the issuer from becoming involved in the underlying 
transaction, as would necessarily happen if the issuer's customer 
could enjoin the issuer from payment on the grounds of fraud in 
the underlying transaction. This purpose is not served with re-
spect to the beneficiary, however, because the beneficiary is al-
ready involved in the underlying transaction (typically as the 
seller in a buy-sell transaction). Therefore, the Court of Appeal 
held that the beneficiary could be enjoined.66 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the ex-
ception created in Mitsui Manufacturers Bank. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning was also based on the purpose of the California 
rule. However, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclu-
sion regarding the applicability of that purpose to the benefi-
ciary. In Trans Meridian Trading Inc. v. Empresa Nacional de 
Comercializacion de Insumos,67 the court reasoned that the pur-
pose for California's version is broader than merely protecting 
the issuer from becoming exposed to the underlying transaction. 
Rather, it reflects a "seemingly strong policy honoring letters of 
credit"68 and providing the "certainty that should accompany 
letter of credit transactions."69 Such a policy is best furthered by 
prohibiting all injunctions against honor, not just those brought 
against the issuer, because certainty of payment will be eroded if 
the beneficiary can be enjoined.70 Hence, the Ninth Circuit 
reached a contrary result to that of the Court of Appeal, even 
though both courts reasoned according to the purpose of the 
California provision. The Trans Meridian Trading case also 
65. [d. at 1058, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 222. 
66. [d. at 1059, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. 
67. 829 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1987). 
68. [d. at 956. 
69. [d. at 955. 
70. [d. at 956. In Trans Meridian Trading, the Ninth Circuit also distinguished the 
facts of Mitsui Manufacturers Bank, supra note 64, on the un persuasive ground that in 
the Mitsui Manufacturers Bank case the letter of credit specifically referenced the un-
derlying contract, thereby bringing the underlying contract into issue, whereas the letter 
of credit in the Trans Meridian Trading case did not mention the underlying contract. 
Trans Meridian Trading, 829 F.2d at 957. 
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demonstrates that purpose reasoning can be used to reject pro-
posed exceptions to Code provisions as well as to create them.71 
3. Interpretation to Avoid Contradicting Purpose of Provision 
Courts have interpreted Code prOViSIOns in order to avoid 
contradicting or defying the purpose of the provision. Such rea-
soning can cause a court to create an exception to a Code provi-
sion in order to avoid applying the provision to facts where its 
purpose would be defied. Conversely, a court might refuse to 
create an exception to a provision where the exception would 
71. In S & R Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 859 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1988), 
the Ninth Circuit rejected another proposed exception to a Code provision where the 
purpose of such an exception did not apply to the facts of the case. The relevant provi-
sion was continued in U.C.C. § 2-608(1) whereby a buyer who satisfies certain conditions 
"may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit." Both "lot" and "commercial 
unit" are defined in such a way that revoking acceptance of a lot means revoking accept-
ance of an entire delivery, whereas revoking acceptance of a commercial unit means re-
voking acceptance of a portion of a delivery. Thus, an aggrieved buyer qualifying under § 
2-608(1) has the option to revoke as to either all the goods delivered or a portion thereof. 
In the S & R Metals case the seller argued for an exception to the buyer's § 2-608(1) 
option whereby, due to the facts of the case, the buyer would be required to revoke only 
as to a commercial unit and not allowed to revoke as to the whole lot. In this case, 
plaintiff bought various gauges of steel from defendant. Plaintiff could establish that the 
14-gauge steel delivered by defendant, constituting one-fourth of the total tonnage under 
the parties' contract, was defective. Nevertheless, plaintiff revoked its acceptance of the 
entire delivery of steel of all gauges. Defendant argued that, on these facts, plaintiff 
should be allowed to revoke only as to the defective 14-gauge steel and not as to the 
entirety. Despite the seemingly clear option given to a buyer to revoke either a lot or a 
commercial unit under § 2-608(1), defendant argued that plaintiff could not revoke as to 
the entire "lot" but only the lesser "commercial unit" of 14-gauge steel, because it would 
be unfair to permit plaintiff to revoke the entirety when such a small proportion was 
defective. Under this logic, the entire shipment consisted of two commercial units, defec-
tive 14-gauge steel and non-14 gauge steel. Because plaintiff could not prove that the 
non-14-gauge steel was defective, plaintiff should not be allowed to revoke as to that 
commercial unit. Thus an exception to the buyers right to revoke as to a whole lot should 
be created when the defective portion is small. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's proposed exception to the buyer's right 
to revoke as to the whole lot under § 2-608(1). The court reasoned that the purpose of 
the "commercial unit" option is to prevent a buyer who has elected not to revoke a whole 
lot from taking advantage of the situation by returning to the seller less than a commer-
cially resalable unit. Under the "commercial unit" option, a buyer may not return com-
ponents of an item that have a reduced market value compared to the item itself and 
thereby leave the seller in an unfair position. In the S & R Metals case, by contrast, the 
buyer returned more than a commercial unit and did not prejudice the seller by re-
turning too little. Therefore, because the purpose of the commercial unit option is not 
served in this situation, it is not necessary or even logical to impose that option on the 
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defy the purpose of the provision. A court using such reasoning 
might also interpret gaps and ambiguities in the statutory lan-
guage in such a way as to avoid contradicting the purpose of the 
provision.72 
72. Another Code provision which has been interpreted to avoid contradicting its 
purpose is California Commercial Code § 6111, which provides that the one-year statute 
of limitations for defrauded creditors of a bulk transferor begins to run when the trans-
feree takes possession of the goods, but where "the transfer had been concealed" the 
one-year statute does not begin to run until the creditors discover the bulk transfer. 
California Commercial Code § 6111 provides a one-year limitations period as does 
the newly revised U.C.C. § 6-110 (1988 Official Text). The two versions both provide that 
where the transfer has been concealed, the limitations period runs from the date when 
the person bringing the action discovers the bulk transfer. Revised U.C.C. § 6-110 (1988 
Official Text) provides: 
§ 6-110. Limitation of Actions. 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), an action under this 
Article against a buyer, auctioneer, or liquidator must be com-
menced within one year after the date of the bulk sale. 
(2) If the buyer, auctioneer, or liquidator conceals the fact 
that the sale has occurred, the limitation is tolled and an ac-
tion under this Article may be commenced within the earlier 
of (i) one year after the person bringing the action discovers 
that the sale has occurred or (ii) one year after the person 
bringing the action should have discovered that the sale has 
occurred, but no later than two years after the date of the 
bulk sale. Complete noncompliance with the requirements of 
this Article does not of itself constitute concealment. 
(3) An action under Section 6-107(11) must be commenced 
within one year after the alleged violation occurs. 
California Commercial Code § 6111 provides in relevant part: 
(a) No action under this division shall be brought nor levy 
made more than one year after the date on which the trans-
feree took possession of the goods unless the transfer has been 
concealed. If the transfer has been concealed, an action may 
be brought or levy made within one year after its discovery by 
the creditor bringing such action or making such levy or after 
it should have been discovered by such creditor in the exercise 
or reasonable diligence, whichever first occurs. 
In In re Borba, 736 F. 2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984), the facts cast doubt on when a trans-
fer had been concealed. There the transfer had been concealed in the sense that the bulk 
transferee had not complied with the notice requirements of Article 6. However, no addi-
tional affirmative acts of fraud or concealment had taken place. Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit had to interpret whether the transfer had been "concealed" solely by reason of 
the transferee's failure to comply with the bulk transfer notice requirements. Because 
the transfer had taken place more than a year prior to the transferor's bankruptcy, the 
cause of action in In re Borba would be barred if the transfer had not been "concealed." 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the special statute of limitations for 
concealment situations does not apply where the "concealment" consists only of a failure 
to comply with the requirements of the Bulk Sales Article. The Court reached its result 
in order to avoid contradicting the purpose of the usual statute of limitations (commenc-
ing on the date the transferee took possession). The purpose of the usual statute of limi-
tations is to require prompt action by the aggrieved creditors, whereas the "conceal-
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In Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Financial Ser-
vices, Inc.'3 the Ninth Circuit created an exception to a Code 
provision because the application of the provision to the facts of 
the case would contradict the purpose behind the provision. The 
first-to-file rule of section 9-312(5)(a)" provides that where two 
perfected secured parties have an interest in the same collateral, 
the first of the secured parties to have properly filed a financing 
statement on the collateral has priority over the other. In Bank 
of the West the following situation occurred: (1) perfected se-
cured party A filed first in time on debtor A's accounts receiva-
ble, including after-acquired receivables; (2) perfected secured 
party B filed subsequently in time on debtor B's accounts re-
ceivable, and (3) debtor B transferred its accounts receivable to 
debtor A.7Ii Because both secured party A and secured party B 
on these facts have a perfected security interest in the collateral 
in the hands of debtor A,'s it is necessary to determine which 
ment" statute of limitations is intended to permit such creditors extra time. To treat a 
failure of notice as a concealment would contradict the purpose of the usual statute of 
limitations by permitting all creditors who failed to receive notice to elect the more gen-
erous "concealment" statute of limitations. In re Borba, 736 F.2d at 1320. This result is 
consistent with the provision of the newly revised U.C.C. § 6-110(2) that "[cJomplete 
noncompliance with the provision of this Article does not of itself constitute 
concealment. " 
73. 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). 
74. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) codifies the first-to-file rule. Actually, the rule is more accu-
rately stated as preferring the first secured party who either files or perfects in prefer-
ence to other secured parties. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) provides: 
(5) In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this sec-
tion (including cases of purchase money security interests 
which do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in sub-
section (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting 
security interests in the same collateral shall be determined 
according to the following rules: 
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to prior-
ity in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time 
a filing is first made covering the collateral or the time the 
security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, pro-
vided that there is no period thereafter when there is neither 
filing nor perfection. 
75. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1164-66. 
76. Secured party A has a perfected security interest in the disputed collateral by 
virtue of its after-acquired collateral clause. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) provides, with exceptions, 
that "a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by the secur-
ity agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral." Therefore, when debtor A 
subsequently acquired the collateral, secured party A, having previously filed on such 
collateral, gets a perfected security interest it. On the other hand, secured party B is 
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has priority. Between these two perfected secured parties the 
first-to-file rule would indicate that secured party A would pre-
vail over secured party B because secured party A filed first in 
time on the accounts receivable. This was the result reached by 
the district court in this case.77 
Reasoning that the purpose of the first-to-file rule is at odds 
with its application to this situation, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court on this issue and created a 
new exception to section 9-312(5)(a) whereby the later filing 
transferor's secured party prevails over the earlier filing trans-
feree's secured party who claims under an after-acquired collat-
eral clause. One purpose of the first-to-file rule that would be 
defeated by its application in Bank of the West is to give assur-
ance to the first filer on a particular debtor that it will enjoy 
priority with respect to that debtor's collateral. This is the car-
rot to guarantee prompt filing. When the transferor's secured 
party (secured party B) has complied with the filing require-
ments with respect to the transferor (debtor B), it would violate 
this purpose to deny priority to the transferor's secured party. 
Secured party B filed first on debtor B and thus gave notice to 
subsequent creditors of debtor B; yet its deserved reward of pri-
ority is lost if the first-to-file rule applies after debtor B trans-
fers the collateral to debtor A.78 Another purpose of the first-to-
file rule which would not be served here is to ensure that record 
notice of security interests is given to future creditors of a 
debtor. This "notice-giving" function is not achieved in the 
Bank of the West situation because a filing by secured party A 
against debtor A imparts no notice to the creditors of debtor B, 
including secured party B, because debtor B's creditors will 
search the record for filings against debtor B, not debtor A.79 
Another decision creating an exception to a Code provision 
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security in-
terest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or 
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized 
by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, 
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including col-
lections received by the debtor. 
77. Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Financial Services, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 
807,817 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
78. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1173. 
79. [d. at 1172-73. 
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in order to avoid contradicting the purpose of the provision is 
Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Frazier.80 The provision at is-
sue was section 3-606(1)(b),81 which provides for the discharge of 
"any party to the instrument" when the holder "(u)njustifiably 
impairs collateral for the instrument given by . . . the party." 
When the holder of a note impairs collateral by exchanging it for 
less valuable collateral, the maker's liability will increase to the 
extent that more debt will be left owing after application of the 
substituted collateral than would have been owing if the original 
collateral were still available. By the literal wording of section 3-
606(1)(b) it would seem that the maker ought to be discharged 
in this situation. Certainly the maker would seem to qualify as 
"any party to the instrument." Yet in Great Southwest Life the 
Ninth Circuit recently recognized an exception to section 3-
606(1)(b) by holding that "any party to the instrument" does 
not include the maker.82 The court determined from Official 
Comment 183 to section 3-606 that this provision is intended to 
protect parties in the position of a surety (e.g., a guarantor or 
accommodation maker). The court reasoned that it would con-
flict with this purpose to permit the maker, who is not a surety, 
to be discharged. Therefore "any party" does not include the 
maker. Although it would seem that "any party" simply does not 
mean "any party but the maker," by reasoning that the drafter's 
purpose is not to benefit the maker, it is logical to except the 
80. 860 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1988). 
81. U.C.C. § 3-606(I)(b) provides: 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the 
extent that without such party's consent the holder 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument 
given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom 
he has a right of recourse. 
82. Great Southwest Life, 860 F.2d at 900-01. The holding that "any party" to the 
instrument does not include the maker of the instrument, is in accord with that of most 
other jurisdictions. See e.g., FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, 766 F.2d 744, 749-51 
(3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 1983); see also 
Annotation, 93 A.L.R. 3d 1283 (1979 and supp. 1988). 
83. Official Comment 1 to U.C.C: § 3-606 provides: 
The words "any party to the instrument" remove an uncer-
tainty arising under the original section. The suretyship de-
fenses here provided are not limited to parties who are "secon-
darily liable," but are available to any party who is in the 
position of a surety, having a right of recourse either on the 
instrument or dehors it, including an accommodation maker or 
acceptor known to the holder to be so. 
25
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maker from the term "any party to the instrument." 
A court might also refuse to recognize an exception to a 
Code provision on the ground that the exception would contra-
dict the purpose of the provision, as in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Price.8• In this case, Ford Motor Credit argued for an exception 
to the statutory requirements for notice of sale of collateral 
based on its substantial compliance with those requirements. 
The California Commercial Code contains a unique variation 
from the Uniform version with regard to the required notice of 
sale of collateral under section 9-504(3),811 so that, among other 
things,88 notice of a public sale must appear in a newspaper pub-
lished in the county where the sale is to be held, whereas the 
U.C.C. requires only that the secured party give "reasonable" 
notice of such sale.87 Ford had published notice in the wrong 
county and sought to argue that it had nevertheless substan-
tially complied with section 9-504(3). The California Court of 
Appeal reasoned that an exception based on Ford's substantial 
compliance would undermine the very purpose of the California 
provision. That purpose is to prevent undue litigation as to what 
notice is required for a valid foreclosure sale by instructing the 
foreclosing secured party exactly how to proceed with notice.88 
This is in contrast to the more general "reasonable" notice stan-
84. 163 Cal. App. 3d 745, 210 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1985). 
85. California Commercial Code § 9504(3) provides in part: 
Notice of the time and place of a public sale shall also be 
given at least five days before the date of sale by publication 
once in a newspaper of general circulation published in the 
county in which the sale is to be held. 
No such requirement appears in the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 9·504(3), supra note 29. 
86. In addition to the requirement of notice of sale by publication, California Com· 
mercial Code § 9504(3) varies from the U.C.C. by more carefully defining the required 
notice of sale to be given to the debtor: 
Such notice must be delivered personally or be deposited in 
the United States mail postage prepaid addressed to the 
debtor at his address as set forth in the financing statement or 
as set forth in the security agreement or at such other address 
as may have been furnished to the secured party in writing for 
this purpose, or, if no address has been so set forth or fur· 
nished, at his last known address, and to any other secured 
party at the address set forth in his request for notice, at least 
five days before the date fixed for any public sale or before the 
day on or after which any private sale or other disposition has 
been made. 
87. See U.C.C. § 9·504(3), supra note 29. 
88. Ford Motor Credit, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 750·51, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 20·21. 
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dard of the U.C.C., which invites litigation by its uncertainty. 
The suggested exception for substantial compliance would rein-
troduce the uncertainty and potential for litigation that the Cal-
ifornia notice provisions are intended to remove. Therefore, the 
court refused to create such an exception.89 
The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted a gap in the concep-
tual scheme of section 2-20790 in order to avoid contradicting the 
purpose of that section in Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack 
Corp.9} Under section 2-207 a contract may be formed even 
though the terms of the acceptance vary those of the offer. How-
ever, if the acceptance expressly conditions acceptance on the 
offeror's assent to the offeree's varying terms contained in the 
acceptance, the parties differing forms do not result in a con-
tract unless the offeror assents to the varying terms in the ac-
ceptance. If the offeror assents, the parties have a contract and 
the offeree's varying terms are part of that contract. If the of-
feror does not assent, there will be no contract unless the parties 
proceed with the transaction, in which case their performance 
89. [d. at 751, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 21. 
90. The court applied and interpreted Oregon law identical to u.c.C. § 2-207, which 
provides: 
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation. 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time 
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless 
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the ad-
ditional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms be-
come part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of 
the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been 
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them 
is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although 
the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a con-
tract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist 
of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, to-
gether with any supplementary terms incorporated under any 
other provisions of this Act. 
91. 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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results in the formation of a contract by conduct.92 Within this 
framework there lurks an ambiguity. When the acceptance is 
conditioned on the offeror's assent to the offeree's varying terms, 
it is unclear what constitutes the offeror's assent that would 
form a contract on the offeree's terms. Such assent might argua-
bly be interpreted to include an implied assent based on the of-
feror's performance of the deal after the offeree has made known 
its varying terms, or such assent might arguably be interpreted 
more narrowly to require the offeror's express assent. 
In Diamond Fruit Growers, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
offeror's assent must be express and cannot be implied from the 
offeror's performance of the parties' deal. The court reasoned 
that the purpose of section 2-207 is to achieve neutrality be-
tween offeror and offeree by expunging the "last shot" rule.9a 
Under that rule, where the parties' performance results in a con-
tract by conduct, the party who sends the last form in the ex-
change of forms gets all of its terms included in the contract. To 
interpret section 2-207 so that the parties' performance consti-
tutes the offeror's implied assent to the offeree's terms violates 
the neutrality principle of section 2-207 by reinstating the last 
shot principle. Such an interpretation would permit the party 
with the last form (here the offeree) to have its terms govern 
through the fiction of the offeror's impled assent. In order to 
avoid undermining this purpose of section 2-207, the court held 
that where the offeree has conditioned its acceptance on assent 
to its terms, only an express assent by the offeror could bind the 
offeror to the offeree's terms.94 
~ 
4. Interpretation Adopted Because Supported by Purposes of 
Code Generally 
Sometimes courts have interpreted an ambiguous Code pro-
vision by resort to the more general purposes of the Code, rather 
than the purpose of the provision at issue. These general pur-
92. [d. at 1443-44. Such a contract by conduct is recognized by U.C.C. § 2-207(3). 
Under § 2-207(3) the terms of such a contract are "those terms on which the parties 
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions 
of [the U.C.C.I." See U.C.C. § 2-207(3), supra note 90. 
93. Diamond Fruit Growers, 794 F.2d at 1444. 
94. [d. at 1445. 
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poses include the accommodation of commercial practices,9& the 
goal of uniformity among the jurisdictions,96 and the promotion 
of good faith.9? It is also possible to interpret a provision accord-
ing to the more general purposes of an Article of the Code. 
The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted an ambiguous provi-
sion in order to accomplish the general Code purpose of accom-
modating commercial practices in In re Black & White Cattle 
CO.98 The provision at issue was section 2-402(2)99 whereby a 
merchant-seller may retain possession of goods sold for a "com-
mercially reasonable time" without violating the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act. loO Ordinarily, a seller may not retain possession 
of goods sold because such retention would mislead creditors as 
to the ownership of the goods, but an exception to this require-
ment occurs when retention is only for a "commercially reasona-
95. According to u.c.C. § 1-102(2)(b), supra note 11, one of the underlying purposes 
of the V.C.C. is to "permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage and agreement of the parties." The court in In re Black & White Cattle Co., 
783 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) found in V.C.C.§ 1-102(2)(b) a broad Code purpose to 
accommodate commercial practices. [d. at 1460. See infra text accompanying notes 98-
102. 
96. According to U.C.C.§ 1-102(2)(c), supra note 11, one of the underlying purposes 
of the U.C.C. is "to make uniform the law among various jurisdictions." An example of a 
decision where a court adopted an interpretation at least in part to conform to the ma-
jority view of other jurisdictions, and thereby further the purpose of making the law 
uniform among the jurisdictions, is Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County 184 Cal. App. 
3d 1119, 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 (1986). For a discussion of the purpose reasoning 
in Connolly, see supra text accompanying notes 28-36. 
97. V.C.C. § 1-203 provides: 
§ 1-203. Obligation of Good Faith. 
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes ap obligation 
of good faith in its performance or enforcement, 
In Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 442, 249 Cal. 
Rptr. 872, 877 (1988), the court reasoned in part that its interpretation of the statute of 
frauds was justified because it was consistent with the general Code purpose of fostering 
good faith. 
98. 783 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
99. V.C.C. § 2-402(2) provides: 
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification 
of goods to a contract for sale as void if as against him a reten-
tion of possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of 
law of the state where the goods are situated, except that re-
tention of possession in good faith and current course of trade 
by merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a 
sale or identification is not fraudulent. 
100. The relevant fraudulent conveyance legislation was CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440, 
which provides that a transfer is void against the transferor's creditors where the trans-
fer is "not accompanied by an immediate delivery followed by an actual and continued 
change of possession" of the property transferred. 
29
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ble time." In Black & White Cattle Co., the court interpreted 
the meaning of a "commercially reasonable time" for retention 
in a way to achieve the general Code purpose of accommodating 
commercial practices.lol So interpreted, a commercially reasona-
ble time is a length of time consistent with accomplishing the 
legitimate business practices involved. Because the seller, a cat-
tle feed lot operator, had retained possession of cattle sold to the 
buyer in order for the seller to feed and fatten the cattle in 
preparation for delivering them to the buyer's customers and be-
cause such a feeding arrangement was alleged to be common in 
the cattle feeding industry, the court held that summary judg-
ment against the buyer on the issue of a commercially reasona-
ble time for the seller's retention would be improper. l02 
Similar reasoning was employed in In re Hawaii Corp.l03 
where the court interpreted V.C.C. section 8-207(1)10' which 
provides that the issuer of stock may treat the registered owner 
as the true owner in preference to an unregistered transferee. In 
Hawaii Corp. the perfected secured party had not registered the 
stock collateral in its name. Therefore, it was argued that the 
issuer could ignore the secured party's interest in a liquidating 
dividend paid by the issuer. 1011 The court reasoned in part that 
an exception to section 8-207(1) for the neglected secured party 
was consistent with the fundamental Code purpose "to permit 
the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage, and agreement of the parties."1oe It would be con-
trary to this purpose to apply section 8-207(1) on these facts be-
cause such an interpretation would interfere with the utility of 
stock certificates as collateral by imposing on secured parties the 
extra burden of registering their stock.l07 
101. Black & White Cattle Co., 783 F.2d at 1460. See supra note 95. 
102. [d. at 1461. 
103. 829 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1987). 
104. V.C.C. § 8-207(1) provides: 
(1) Prior to due presentment for registration of transfer of a 
certificated security in registered form, the issuer or indenture 
trustee may treat the registered owner as the person exclu-
sively entitled to vote, to receive notifications, and otherwise 
to exercise all the rights and powers of an owner. 
105. Hawaii Corp., 829 F.2d at 815. The facts of Hawaii Corp. are more fully de-
scribed infra notes 137-141 and acccompanying text. 
106. V.C.C. § 1-102(a), supra note 11. 
107. Hawaii Corp., 829 F.2d at 816-17. 
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The court also relied on the overall purpose of Article 8 of 
the Code. The court determined that application of section 8-
207(1) to the facts of Hawaii Corp. would run counter to the 
purpose and spirit of Article 8, which is to confer negotiability 
upon securities. lOB That purpose would be negated if the regis-
tered owner retained rights that could frustrate the rights of the 
transferee secured party. 
5. Interpretation Held Resolved Expressly by Code Provisions 
Courts have used one Code provision to fill a gap or resolve 
an ambiguity in another provision. The reasoning is that, given 
the express terms of provision A, the court has no choice but to 
interpret provision B according to provision A. This reasoning 
need not rely on furthering the purpose of either provision. 
Rather, it is simply that the existence of provision A expressly 
resolves the interpretive issue in provision B, even though 
neither provision refers to the other. Following this approach, 
courts have relied on the Official Comments,109 operative Code 
sections and Code definitions to interpret other Code provisions. 
108. [d. 
109. In Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13,220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1985), the Court 
of Appeal interpreted U.C.C. § 2-313 by resort to Official Comments 3 and 8 thereto. 
Under section 2-313, dealing with express warranties, it is provided that, in order to be 
considered an express warranty a seller's statement may not be "merely the seller's opin-
ion or commendation of the goods." If a statement is merely an opinion or commenda-
tion then an express warranty is not created. U.C.C. § 2-313(2). Furthermore, to consti-
tute an express warranty, a statement must be "part of the basis of the bargain." The 
interpretive difficulty is that the Code does not define the terms "opinion or commenda-
tion" or "basis of the bargain". A court must therefore interpret in order to distinguish a 
warranty-creating "affirmation of fact or promise" from a non-warranty-creating "opin-
ion or commendation". Similarly, a court must interpret the meaning of the phrase "ba-
sis of the bargain." 
In Keith v. Buchanan, the Court of Appeal interpreted the foregoing terms to deter-
mine whether an express warranty was created where a sales brochure described the 
seller's boat as "a picture of sure-footed seaworthiness" and as "a carefully well-
equipped and very seaworthy vessel." In holding that this language constituted an ex-
press warranty rather than an opinion, the court was also guided by Official Comment 8 
to section 2-313, which creates a presumption in favor of warranty unless good reasons 
are shown to the contrary based on the objective circumstances surrounding the sale. [d. 
at 21, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 396. The court also was guided by the provision of Official Com-
ment 3 that the buyer need not show any particular reliance on the seller's affirmations 
in order to make them part of the basis of the bargain and that the burden is on the 
seller to prove that such affirmations were not part of the agreement. [d. at 22-23, 220 
Cal. Rptr. at 397-98. On the facts of Keith v. Buchanan, the seller had not carried its 
burden to prove that the representations in the sales brochure were opinions rather than 
warranties and that such representations were not part of the basis of the bargain. 
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Two recent decisions have used section 1-205(4)110 to resolve 
interpretive issues in other provisions. Section 1-205(4) provides 
that the express terms of an agreement control over the parties' 
course of dealing. In In re Ellsworthlll the issue was the inter-
pretation of section 9-306(2),112 which provides that when a 
debtor sells or disposes of collateral, the secured party's security 
interest continues in that collateral in the hands of the new 
buyer "unless the disposition was authorized by the secured 
party in the security agreement or otherwise .... " In Ellsworth, 
the security agreement required the secured party's prior writ-
ten consent to the debtor's sale of collateral, while the parties 
had established a course of dealing whereby the secured party 
had previously permitted such sales without its written con-
sent. U3 The issue was whether a subsequent sale of collateral 
could be deemed authorized "otherwise" by reason of the parties 
course of dealing. The Ninth Circuit held that such a course of 
dealing did not "otherwise" authorize the sale of collateral. The 
court relied mainlyla on the general rule of section 1-205(4) that 
express terms control course of dealing. Hence the express term 
requiring written consent would control the course of dealing 
dispensing with written consent. 1111 
The Ninth Circuit also relied on section 1-205(4) to decide 
whether an "at will" acceleration clause in a note could be 
waived by the holder's past course of dealing where the note ex-
pressly provided against such waiver. Usually section 1-208116 
110. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) provides: 
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable 
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever 
reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such con-
struction is unreasonable express terms control both course of 
dealing and usage of trade and course dealing controls usage 
of trade. 
111. 722 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984). 
112. U.C.C. § 9-306(2), supra note 44. In Ellsworth, the court interpreted ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 44-3127.B, which is the same as U.C.C. § 9-306(2). 
113. Ellsworth, 722 F.2d at 1450. 
114. The court also employed purpose reasoning. Because the purpose of U.C.C. § 9-
306(2) is to protect the unpaid secured party ("That is what § 44-3127.B is all about."), 
and because the situation in Ellsworth was "the very situation in which it [§ 9-306(2)] 
was designed to protect [the unpaid secured party]," it would be "going too far" to find 
an implied consent by an unpaid secured party on these facts. Id. at 1451. 
115. It is possible to reach a different conclusion on this issue, however. See infra 
notes 231-235 and accompanying text. 
116. U.C.C. § 1-208 provides: 
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governs at will acceleration terms, but that section is silent on 
the question of waiver. In U.S. v. Grayson ll7 the guarantor of a. 
note argued that the payee had waived its right to accelerate at 
will because of the payee's unwritten assurances and its gener-
ally lenient collection policy. The court held that section 1-
205(4) resolved the question of waiver against the guarantor 
where the note required a written waiver and there was none.118 
By way of further example, two other recent decisions have 
used section 9-402(1)118 to interpret ambiguities in other Code 
provisions. Section 9-402(1) provides that, in order to perfect a 
security interest, a financing statement must "contain a state-
ment indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral." 
The required description of collateral is further elaborated in 
V.C.C. section 9-110 which provides that the description of col-
lateral does not have to be specific if it "reasonably identifies" 
the collateral.12o There is an ambiguity on the face of this provi-
sion in the phrase "reasonably identifies." In order to apply sec-
tion 9-110 a court must necessarily interpret this phrase because 
the court must determine whether any given description "rea-
sonably identifies" the collateral. Similarly, section 9-402(8) per-
mits a financing statement to be effective if it is "substantially 
§ 1-208. Option to Accelerate at Will. 
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest 
may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral 
or additional collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself 
insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to 
mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith 
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is im-
paired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the 
party against whom the power has been exercised. 
117. 879 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1989) 
118. ld. at 624. 
119. V.C.C. § 9-402(1) provides in part: 
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the 
debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an 
address of the secured party from which information concern-
ing the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing ad-
dress of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the 
types, or describing the items, of collateral. 
120. V.C.C. § 9-110 provides: 
§ 9-110. Sufficiency of Description. 
For the purposes of this Article any description of personal 
property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific 
if it reasonably identifies what is described. 
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complying" and "not seriously misleading."l21 This provision re-
quires interpretation because it is not certain in any case 
whether the language used in the financing statement is "sub-
stantially complying" and "not seriously misleading." 
In In re Boogie Enterprises, Inc. 122 the Ninth Circuit held 
that the phrase "personal property" was not a sufficient descrip-
tion of collateral. In reaching its result, the court interpreted the 
requirement of section 9-110 that collateral be reasonably identi-
fied. The court reasoned that what constitutes a reasonable 
description under section 9-110 can be gleaned by consulting 
section 9-402(1). Because the latter section requires a descrip-
tion of collateral to potential creditors by "type" or "item,"123 it 
is also necessary to describe collateral by item or type in order 
to reasonably identify collateral under the former section. A 
description of collateral as "personal property" does not satisfy 
this requirement and so cannot reasonably identify the collateral 
under section 9_110.124 
In In re So/talk Publishing Co. Inc.,l2I', the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted section 9-402(8)126 to mean that where no descrip-
tion of collateral was given in a filed financing statement the 
mere filing of the financing statement, although giving inquiry 
notice to potential creditors of the debtor, was not "substan-
tially complying" and was "seriously misleading."127 As in 
Boogie Enterprises, the court put content into these ambiguous 
phrases by referring to the requirement of section 9-402(1) that 
collateral must be defined by "type" or "item". Thus, failure so 
to describe the collateral could not be "substantially complying" 
and must be "seriously misleading," mqUIry notice 
notwithstanding. 128 
121. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) provides: 
(8) A financing statement substantially complying with the re-
quirements of this section is effective even though it contains. 
minor errors which are not seriously misleading. 
122. 866 F.2d 1172 (1989). 
123. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1), supra note 119. 
124. Boogie Enterprises, 866 F.2d at 1175. 
125. 856 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1989). 
126. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8), supra note 121. 
127. Softalk Publishing, 856 F.2d at 1330-31. 
128. [d. 
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Sometimes the use of Code definitions may resolve an inter-
pretive issue,129 as in Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool CO.180 
At issue was the applicability of Code section 2-725,lSl which 
states that an "action for breach of any contract for sale must be 
commenced within four years after the cause of action has ac-
crued." A cause of action for breach of warranty usually accrues 
129. In two recent decisions the definition of "proceeds" created an interpretive is-
sue. The term "proceeds" is defined in section 9-306(1) to include "whatever is received 
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." This 
definition is important because, when the debtor sells or disposes of collateral, the se-
cured party may have to look to the proceeds for satisfaction. Despite the careful defini-
tion, two recent cases have required the courts to interpret whether, under the facts 
involved, the definition of proceeds is satisfied. In Johanson Transportation Service v. 
Rich Pk'd Rite, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 3d 583, 210 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1985) (case name also 
identified as Johanson Transportation Service v. Jimmy Grizzard Sales, Inc. at 210 Cal. 
Rptr. 433), the California Court of Appeal interpreted the term "proceeds" to mean that 
where the collateral was strawberries sold by the debtor and the buyers' payment in-
cluded freight charges incident to shipping the strawberries, the freight charges were 
part of the proceeds of the collateral to which the secured party was entitled under sec-
tion 9-306(2). To reach this conclusion the court emphasized that proceeds are defined so 
that whateuer is received upon the sale of collateral constitutes proceeds. By emphasiz-
ing the word "whatever," the court stated that an exception for freight charges is ex-
pressly rejected by the definition of proceeds. [d. at 592, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 438. 
In Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp., 197 Cal. App. 3d 638, 242 Cal. Rptr. 
914 (1988), the court used the definition of "account" to justify an expansive interpreta-
tion of the term "proceeds." Proceeds are defined as "whatever is received" upon the sale 
of collateral, but this definition does not specify who must receive the proceeds. In Pro-
ducers Cotton Oil the debtor sold crop collateral. The debtor did not receive the monies 
paid for the collateral, but such amounts were paid to third parties for their expenses in 
harvesting the crop. If the payments were proceeds, the secured party would be entitled 
to them. It was argued that the payment could not be proceeds because proceeds must 
be "received" by the debtor. The court rejected this argument because under Division 9 
an "account" had arisen in favor of the debtor when the collateral was sold even though 
the debtor never received payment. Hence, because the unpaid account is proceeds in 
any event, the court declined to impose a requirement that the debtor must receive pay-
ment in order for proceeds to have arisen. [d. at 651, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 921. 
130. 152 Cal. App. 3d 951, 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984). 
131. V.C.C. § 2-725 provides in relevant part: 
§ 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale. 
1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has ac-
crued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the 
period of limitation to not less than one year but may not ex-
tend it. 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regard-
less of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A 
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, 
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future per-
formance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await 
the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when 
the breach is or should have been discovered. 
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when tender of delivery is made.132 Thus if section 2-725 applies 
in a breach of warranty action the plaintiff will have a four year 
limitation period commencing upon the tender of delivery of the 
goods. In Fundin a well driller purchased a drill rig from a ma-
chine company after reviewing the manufacturer's brochure and 
other material. The manufacturer was not a party to the con-
tract between the well driller and the machine company. When 
the well driller sued the manufacturer for breach of warranty, 
the manufacturer demurred on the ground that the three and a 
half year interval between the contract date and the date the 
complaint was filed required dismissal under the two-year stat-
ute of limitations applicable under California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 339.133 The buyer argued for the standard four 
year limitation under section 2-725. 
On these facts the interpretive issue is whether there was a 
"contract for sale" between the driller and the manufacturer as 
required by section 2-725. The Court of Appeal determined this 
issue by reference to the Code definition of contract134 and the 
Code definition of sale.m There was no "contract for sale" be-
tween the parties according to the Code definition, because the 
title to the drill rig and the purchase price were not exchanged 
between the parties as required by the Code definitions. Using 
such reasoning, the court determined that section 2-725 was in-
applicable and instead applied the two year statute of 
limitations. 136 
6. Interpretation Adopted By Implication From Other Code 
Provisions 
This technique, like the previous one, relies on one Code 
provision as the source to interpret another provision. However, 
in this situation, the source provision does not expressly answer 
132. u.c.C. § 2-725(2). 
133. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 339(3) provides a two-year statute of limitations for an 
"action based upon the rescission of a contract not in writing." Vnlike V.C.C. § 2-725(2), 
however, the two-year limitations period begins to run "from the date upon which the 
facts that entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred." CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 339(3). 
134. A "contract" is "the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agree-
ment .... " V.C.C. § 1-201(11). 
135. A "sale" consists of "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a 
price." V.C.C. § 2-106(1). 
136. Fundin, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 959-60, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96. 
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the interpretive issue. Rather, the court draws an inference from 
some aspect of the source and interprets the other provision 
from that inference. 
In In re Hawaii Corp.137 the Ninth Circuit relied on infer-
ences drawn from several other Code provisions188 in order to 
interpret Code section 8-207(1)189 The latter provides that until 
a transfer of securities is registered with the issuer, the issuer 
may "treat the registered owner as the person exclusively enti-
tled to vote, to receive notifications and otherwise to exercise all 
the rights and powers of an owner." This section gives the issuer 
the general right to deal with the registered owner when a trans-
feree has failed to register the transfer. In Hawaii Corp. the is-
suer of registered securities had declared bankruptcy and had 
obtained from a registered owner of its stock a release of that 
owner's interest in the issuer. However, at the time of the release 
the stock had already passed to a creditor of the registered 
owner with a perfected security interest in the stock. The per-
fected secured party had not registered the stock in its name. 
When the trustee in bankruptcy of the issuer paid a liquidating 
dividend to the shareholders of the issuer, the trustee refused to 
pay the unregistered perfected secured party on the ground that 
the registered owner had already released its interest. HO The 
trustee argued that under the literal wording of section 8-207(1) 
the issuer had the absolute right to "treat the registered owner 
as the person exclusively entitled to . '. . exercise all the rights 
and powers of an owner." According to the trustee, because the 
registered owner, exercising all the rights and powers of an 
owner, had released its interest, the issuer could treat that re-
lease as effective despite the secured party's unregistered 
interest. 141 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted section 8-207(1) to make it 
inapplicable on these facts. The court looked to other provisions 
of Article 8 which although not directly controlling, carry an im-
137. 829 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1987). 
138. In addition to reasoning from the implications supplied by other Code provi-
sions, the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii Corp. also used purpose reasoning. See supra notes 
103-108 and accompanying text. 
139. V.C.C. § 8-207(1), supra note 104. 
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plication that section 8-207(1) should not be interpreted to cover 
the facts of Hawaii Corp. For example, the presumption of en-
forceability of an instrument under section 8-105(3)(c)142 would 
be thwarted by applying section 8-207(1). Another provision cre-
ating such an implication is section 8-103(3)(a)143 which prevents 
an issuer from creating in its own favor a secret lien on a secur-
ity by requiring the issuer's lien to be noted on the certificate. 
Thus, there is an implication that in order to be consistent with 
section 8-103(3)(a), the issuer in this case should not be allowed 
to create a secret right with respect to shares after the registered 
owner has used those shares to obtain credit from a lender.144 
Furthermore, section 8-405, dealing with lost, destroyed or sto-
len certificates, creates an implication that some risk of loss 
should be on the issuer146 and thus indicates against applying 
section 8-207(1) to completely insulate the issuer. In addition, 
the literal interpretation would run counter to Article 9 of the 
Code because the perfected secured party's expected superior 
protection under Article 9 would be defeated if section 8-207(1) 
were allowed to render the collateral valueless in bankruptcy.148 
The Ninth Circuit held that the interpretation of section 8-
207(1) most in harmony with the rest of the Code is that section 
8-207(1) protects the issuer against an unregistered owner only 
in the normal course of business and not where the unregistered 
owner is a secured party asserting its interest in the stock of a 
bankrupt issuer. 
142. Id. The court mistakenly refers to V.C.C. § 8-105(2)(c). 829 F. 2d at 815. The 
intended reference is to V.C.C. § 8-105(3)(c) which provides: 
(c) if signatures on a certificated security are admitted or es-
tablished, production of the security entities a holder to re-
cover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense or a de-
fect going to the validity of the security; 
143. V.C.C. § 8-103(a) provides: 
A lien upon a security in favor of an issuer thereof is valid 
against a purchaser only if: (a) the security is certificated and 
the right of the issuer to the lien is noted conspicuously 
thereon .... 
144. Hawaii Corp., 829 F.2d at 815. 
145. If the registered owner sells his stock to a bona fide purchaser and then 
presents a claim to the issuer that the stock is lost, and if the issuer issues a new security 
to the registered owner without notice of the existence of the bona fide purchaser, the 
issuer must register the old certificates when presented by the bona fide purchaser. As 
against the bona fide purchaser, the risk is on the issuer. The issuer's recourse is against 
the prior owner. Id. at 816. 
146. Id. at 815-16. 
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In Farmers & Merchants State Bank v Western Bankl,n 
the Ninth Circuit resorted to implications drawn from the Code 
comments to decide which of two potentially applicable Code 
provisions governed. In that case both plaintiff and defendant 
were victims of a check kiting scheme. Defendant had taken 
thirteen third-party checks from plaintiff in exchange for de-
fendant's cashier's check; but because the thirteen checks were 
part of the kite, defendant refused to pay on its cashier's 
check.H8 The district court held that defendant was precluded 
from asserting its defenses to payment because it had "finally 
paid" the thirteen checks with its cashier's check and therefore 
under Code section 4-213(1)149 had become "accountable" to 
plaintiff regardless of any possible defenses. lllo 
The provision potentially in conflict with the district court's 
analysis is section 3-418. m Under its "final payment" rule, in 
contrast to section 4-213(1), defendant could raise its defenses 
unless plaintiff were a holder in due course. Whereas the district 
court held in effect that section 4-213(1) supersedes section 3-
147. 841 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987). 
148. [d. at 1434-1437. 
149. Oregon law applied. Oregon has codified U.C.C. § 4-213 as OR. REV. STAT. § 
74.2130, but has not changed the relevant language. V.C.C. section 4-213(1) provides in 
part: 
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has 
done any of the following, whichever happens first: 
(a) paid the item in cash; or 
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke 
the settlement and without having such right under statute, 
clearing house rule or agreement; or 
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indi-
cated account of the drawer, maker or other person to be 
charged therewith; or 
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed 
to revoke the settlement in the time and manner permitted by 
statute, clearing house rule or agreement. 
150. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 841 F.2d at 1437-38. 
151. Oregon has codified U.C.C. § 3-418 as OR. REV. STAT. § 73-4180 but has not 
changed any of the relevant language. V.C.C. § 3-418 provides: 
§ 3-418. Finality of Payment or Acceptance. 
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Arti-
cle on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except 
for liability for breach of warranty on presentment under the 
preceding section, payment or acceptance of any instrument is 
final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in 
good faith changed his position in reliance on the payment. 
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418, Ilill the Ninth Circuit interpreted section 4-213(1) as having 
no independent substantive effect on the issue of finality. 168 
Even though defendant had "finally paid" and was "accounta-
ble" to plaintiff under section 4-213, the "final payment" rule of 
section 3-418 was applicable and defendant could assert its de-
fenses unless plaintiff were a holder in due course.164 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned by implication. It found noth-
ing in the Official Comments indicating the drafters intended 
section 4-213 to supersede section 3-418.166 On the other hand, 
the court drew an inference from certain Official Comments that 
section 3-418 should govern final payment issues in preference 
to Article 4 provisions such as section 4-213. For example, the 
comments to section 4-403 provide that banks retain "common 
law rights, e.g., to recover money paid under mistake (section 1-
103) in cases where the payment is not made final by section 3-
418."1116 This evidently convinced the court to consider the issue 
of final payment under section 3-418 to be an exception to the 
general rule of section 4-102(1) that Article 4 provisions govern 
those of Article 3.1117 Another inference of the drafters' intent to 
have section 3-418 govern the consequences of final payment on 
the facts of this case was drawn from the comments to section 3-
418 which state that its final payment rule applies "to the pay-
ment of overdrafts, or to any other payments made in error as to 
the state of the drawer's account." Ili8 
7. Interpretation by Analogy 
This style of reasoning is: the current situation is like situa-
tion X; situation X is governed by provision Y; therefore the 
current situation is governed by provision Y. A court may use 
this technique to determine whether a Code provision applies or 
to determine which of two competing Code provisions applies. 
152. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 841 F.2d at 1438. 
153. [d. Accord, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings and Loan Assoc., 
804 F.2d 1487, 1499 (9th Cit. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987). 
154. [d. at 1438. 
155. [d. 
156. Official Comment 8 to U.C.C. § 4-403. 
157. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 841 F.2d at 1438. 
158. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-418. 
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An example of this technique arose in Bank of the West v. 
Commercial Credit Financial Services, Inc. m At issue was 
which of two competing provisions of section 9-402(7)160 should 
apply. One aspect of section 9-402(7) provides that where a filed 
financing statement becomes seriously misleading due to the 
debtor's change of "name, identity or corporate structure", the 
financing statement loses its effectiveness as to collateral ac-
quired by the debtor more than 4 months after the change. On 
the other hand, section 9-402(7) also provides that a filed financ-
ing statement "remains effective with respect to collateral trans-
ferred by the debtor."l61 In Bank of the West, a parent corpora-
tion caused one of its wholly owned subsidiaries to transfer 
encumbered collateral to a second wholly owned subsidiary as 
part of a restructuring plan. The transfer was accomplished by a 
bookkeeping entry rather than a formal structural change such 
as a merger.162 These facts raise the question of whether the 
change-of-structure language governs the transaction or whether 
the transfer-of-assets language governs the transaction.16s The 
court reasoned by analogy that such an asset-shifting transfer 
between wholly owned subsidiaries, done at the behest of the 
159. 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). 
160. V.C.C. § 9-402(7) provides: 
(7) A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the 
debtor if it gives the individual, partnership or corporate name 
of the debtor, whether or not it adds other trade names or 
names of partners. Where the debtor so changes his name or 
in the case of an organization its name, identity or corporate 
structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously 
misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a security in-
terest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four 
months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing 
statement is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed 
financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral 
transferred by the debtor even though the secured party 
knows of or consents to the transfer. 
161. Even though collateral has been transferred by the debtor, the security interest 
continues in the transferred collateral under V.C.C. § 9-306(2), unless the secured party 
authorized the transfer. V.C.C. § 9-306(2), supra note 44. 
162. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1169. 
163. If the transaction is characterized as a change of structure, a secured party of 
the transferor corporation would be perfected as to the transferred collateral and as to 
collateral acquired by the transferee within four months after the transfer; but the trans-
feror's secured party would have to make a new filing in order to be perfected on assets 
acquired by the transferee corporation more than four months after the transfer. If the 
transaction is characterized as a transfer of assets, the transferor's secured party would 
be perfected in the transferred collateral without a new filing, but would not be perfected 
in any assets subsequently acquired by the transferee. V.C.C. § 9-402(7), supra note 160. 
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parent corporation, was like a change of structure and therefore 
invoked the change-of-structure rule of section 9-402(7).164 
B. EXTRA-CODE METHODOLOGY 
Extra-Code methodology has been used to fill gaps in Code 
provisions, to create exceptions to Code provisions, and to re-
solve ambiguities in Code provisions. The source of law for ex-
tra-Code methodology has been both non-Code statutes and 
non-Code general principles. Sometimes, courts have refused to 
interpret according to extra-Code sources. Although extra-Code 
methodology depends on section 1-103, not all courts have ar-
ticulated their extra-Code reasoning in terms of section 1-103. 
1. Non-Code Law Adopted Without Resort to Section 1-103 
Some courts have interpreted Code provisions based on ex-
tra-Code sources without attempting to justify the result under 
section 1-103. One court refused to apply an extra-Code source, 
but did not explain its refusal in terms of section 1_103.161i An-
other court used an extra-Code statute of limitations to super-
sede the relevant Code provisions. 166 
164. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1170-71. Part of the court's reasoning was se-
mantic. The change-of-structure rule requires a refiling where the "debtor" effects a 
change in structure. "Debtor" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d), supra note 31. Based on 
Official Comment 2 to V.C.C. § 9-105, the court determined that the transferor subsidiary 
qualified as a debtor. Comment 2 provides that "sometimes property is transferred sub-
ject to a secured debt of the transferor which the transferee does not assume; in such 
cases, under the second sentence of the definition, the term 'debtor' may, depending 
upon the context, include either or both such persons." Because both the transferor and 
the transferee were commonly owned, the court held that the transferor should be con-
sidered a debtor in the circumstances of the case. [d. at 1170. 
165. See infra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. 
166. In the decertified opinion of Werber v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc, 152 Cal. App. 3d 
1039, 199 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1984), Ordered Not Published, May 24, 1984, the Court of 
Appeal held that the statute of limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 337 
superseded the Code statute of limitations of V.C.C. § 2-725. Vnder U.C.C. § 2-725(2) the 
statute of limitations for breach of warranty begins to run upon delivery of the defective 
goods "regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." On the other 
hand, the superseding non-Code statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff 
should, by exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered the defect. In Werber, the 
court held that because of the difficulty of discovery the statute of limitations had not 
expired on the buyer even though more than four years had passed after delivery. Since 
the court's result seems directly to contradict § 2-725(2), the court's reasoning is instruc-
tive. V.C.C. § 1-103 was not the justification for this holding. Instead the court relied on 
the language of § 2-725(4) and Official Comment 4 thereto for the proposition that § 2-
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss1/6
1990] COMMERCIAL LAW 71 
In Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranchl67 a court resorted to 
outside law without mention of section 1-103 to fill in a gap in 
the Code scheme regarding consequential damages for an ag-
grieved buyer of goods. Section 2-715(2)(a)168 authorizes the 
buyer to recover consequential damages if the buyer's loss was 
foreseeable and "could not reasonably be prevented by cover or 
otherwise." It does not resolve the issue of who bears the burden 
of proof regarding the adequacy of the buyer's efforts, required 
under section 2-715(2)(a), to prevent such loss by cover or other-
wise.169 In Carnation the court resorted to non-Code contract 
case law and there found a general policy that the burden of 
proof is on the breaching party to establish mitigation. The 
court then applied this non-Code rule to section 2-715(2)(a).17o 
Although the result is sensible, no effort was made to explain the 
propriety of using such non-Code authority. In particular, the 
court did not address whether section 1-103 authorizes the use 
of non-Code case law in this context. 
Similar resort to extra-Code sources occurs in SCT, USA, 
Inc., v. Mitsui Manufacturers Bank. l7l There the court used 
outside law to interpret the meaning of Code section 9-403(2) 
725 is not intended to "alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations." Because no 
change in tolling is intended, and because the delayed discovery rule has been "tradition-
ally" applied to implied warranty cases, the court reasoned that § 2-725(2) could be su-
perseded by the delayed-discovery rule of CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 337 without offending 
U.C.C. § 2-725. Apparently this reasoning was based on the misconception that the pur-
pose of § 2-725(4) is to negate the express provision of § 2-725(2) that the statute begins 
to run regardless of a buyer's lack of knowledge of defect. It seems more likely that § 2-
725(4) has no impact at all in § 2-725(2), but rather purports not to alter the law regard-
ing such "tolling" issues as the effect of seller's assurances of cure on the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
167. 189 Cal. App. 3d 809, 229 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1986). 
168. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) provides: 
(2) Consequential damages reSUlting from the seller's breach 
include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting 
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be pre-
vented by cover or otherwise; . . . . 
169. A related issue is who bears the burden of proof with respect to the extent of 
consequential damages. In the Carnation case the court resolved this issue based on Offi-
cial Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 2-715, which specifically places the burden of proof with 
respect to the extent of consequential damages on the buyer. Carnation, 189 Cal. App. 
3d at 815, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 264. 
170. [d. at 816-19, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 264-66. 
171. SCT, USA, Inc. v. Mitsui Manufacturers Bank, 155 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 202 Cal. 
Rptr. 547 (1984). 
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which provides that a financing statement is effective for "a pe-
riod of five years from the date of filing" and that it "lapses on 
the expiration of such five year period unless a continuation 
statement is filed prior to such lapse."172 The issue was whether 
a security interest had lapsed where a secured creditor perfected 
a security interest by filing a financing statement on January 25, 
1977 with the California Secretary of State but did not file a 
continuation statement until January 25, 1982. If the five year 
effective period of the financing statement ran from January 25, 
1977, to January 24, 1982, then the continuation statement 
would be ineffective to achieve continuous perfection because it 
was filed at a time which was not prior to the lapse of the fi-
nancing statement. Even if the financing statement did not lapse 
until January 25, 1982, the continuation statement, filed on the 
same day as the expiration of the financing statement, was ar-
guably not filed "prior to" the lapse as required by section 9-
403(2). The Court of Appeal applied California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 12 to resolve the matter.178 That section pro-
vides that "[t]he time in which any act provided by law is to be 
done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the 
last .... "17' Accordingly, the court interpreted section 9-403(2) 
to mean that the five year effective period of a financing state-
ment filed on January 25, 1977 lasts until midnight of January 
25, 1982. In A continuation statement filed at any time prior to 
172. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) provides: 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (6) a filed financing state-
ment is effective for a period of five years from the date of 
filing. The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses 
on the expiration of the five year period unless a continuation 
statement is filed prior to the lapse. If a security interest per-
fected by filing exists at the time insolvency proceedings are 
commenced by or against the debtor, the security interest re-
mains perfected until termination of the insolvency proceed-
ings and thereafter for a period of sixty days or until expira-
tion of the five year period, whichever occurs later. Upon lapse 
the security interest becomes unperfected, unless it is per-
fected without filing. If the security interest becomes un-
perfected upon lapse, it is deemed to have been unperfected as 
against a person who became a purchaser or lien creditor 
before lapse. 
173. SCT, USA, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d at 1064, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 550. 
174. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 12. 
175. SCT, USA, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d, at 1066, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 551. The court also 
relied on CAL. Gov. CODE § 6806, which defines a day as the period from midnight to the 
following midnight. Id. 
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midnight on January 25, 1982 is timely because it is filed "prior 
to" the expiration of the five year period. However, no reference 
is made to Code section 1-103 or to any other authority to au-
thorize the use of such outside law. 
Even when a court refuses to apply extra-Code law, it may 
fail to explain itself under section 1-103. In Nunes Turfgrass, 
Inc. v. Vaughn-Jacklin Seed Co., Inc.,l7G a California Court of 
Appeal refused to apply California Civil Code section 1668177 to 
resolve a dispute regarding a contractual limitation on damages. 
If applicable, Civil Code section 1668 would arguably have inval-
idated the parties' contractual limitation on damages because 
that section prohibits waiver of liability for the kinds of seller 
negligence alleged in Nunes Turfgrass. 178 However, if V.C.C. 
section 2-719(3) applied to the exclusion of the Civil Code sec-
tion, such limitation on damages would be effective because the 
limitation met the section 2-719(3) standard of being not uncon-
scionable. In rejecting Civil Code section 1668, the court did not 
express the reasons for its interpretation in terms of section 1-
103. Rather, the court reasoned that the more specific statute 
should control the more general statute and that in the commer-
cial setting at hand the relevant Code provision was more 
specific.179 
176. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518, 246 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1988). 
177. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 provides: 
§ 1668 Contracts Contrary to Policy of Law 
CERTAIN CONTRACTS UNLAWFUL. All contracts 
which have for their object, directly or indirectly to exempt 
anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury 
to the person or property of another, in violation of law, 
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of law. 
178. In Nunes Turfgrass, regarding a cause of action for breach of warranty regard-
ing the sale of seeds, the buyer had contracted to limit the seller's liability for negligence, 
breach of warranty or breach of contract to the purchase price of the seeds. The buyer 
had suffered consequential damages in its sod business because of defective seed sup-
plied by the seller. Consequently, the contractual limitation on damages was at issue. 
Under U.C.C. § 2·719(3) such limitation would be effective if not unconscionable, and 
indeed the Court of Appeal held that the limitation was not unconscionable. However, 
the buyer argued for the application of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668, which prohibits waiver of 
liability for negligent violations of statutory law. The buyer argued that the seller had 
negligently violated federal and state seed acts, and could not contract away its liability 
therefor because of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668. Nunes Turgrass. 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1534, 246 
Cal. Rptr. at 833. 
179. [d. at 1539, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 836. 
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2. Non-Code Law Adopted on Authority of Section 1-103 
Many courts have employed extra-Code methodology by ex-
plicit reference to section 1-103. Although these courts have re-
lied on section 1-103 as authority, their approaches to invoking 
section 1-103 and their explanations of when section 1-103 ap-
plies have been varied. 
For example, in T&O Mobile Homes, Inc. v. United Califor-
nia Bank,180 the California Supreme Court used section 1-103 to 
authorize the adoption of non-Code priority rules in lieu of the 
Code priority scheme for secured transactions. At issue was the 
effect of the filing officer's mistaken failure to indicate defend-
ant's security interest on the certificate of ownership covering a 
mobile home subsequently bought by plaintiff.181 In order that a 
good faith purchaser be bound by a previous security interest, 
the California Vehicle Code "full title" system would, if applica-
ble, require that the security interest must be listed on the cer-
tificate of ownership.182 A mistaken omission by the filing officer 
would operate against the secured party under the Vehicle Code. 
On the other hand, under the V.C.C. system once the filing of-
ficer has received the necessary documents from the secured 
party, the secured party achieves perfection and the risk of a 
mistake by the filing officer is on the subsequent purchaser.183 
On the authority of section 1-103, the Supreme Court applied 
the principle of California real property law that where a filing 
officer fails to record a mortgagee's interest, the filing officer's 
error may be attributed to the mortgagee. Thus, the court con-
cluded that responsibility for insuring that the security interest 
in a mobile home is recorded is properly placed on the secured 
180. 40 Cal. 3d 441, 220 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1985). 
181. An ambiguity arises because in connection with the perfection of a security 
interest in a vehicle, boat, mobile home or commercial coach, CAL. COM. CODE § 
9302(3)(b) defers to the California Vehicle Code and the Health and Safety Code for the 
rules regarding perfection of security interests. However, § 9302(3)(b) does not expressly 
so defer with respect to priority disputes. CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(3)(b). 
182. T & 0 Mobile Homes, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 449-50, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. See 
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1800(a), 6301, 6302. 
183. T & 0 Mobile Homes, 40 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 636. Official Com-
ment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-407 states that "the secured party does not bear the risk that the 
filing officer will not properly perform his duties .... " This language indicates that the 
legislature did anticipate the problem of the security interest that does not appear on the 
certificate of title. 
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party.18' In other words, the "full title" system of the Vehicle 
Code supersedes the Commercial Code system and the interest 
of a good faith purchaser prevails over a security interest not 
disclosed on the certificate of ownership.181i 
The Court explained the applicability of section 1-103. As 
paraphrased by the court, section 1-103 provides that "[w]here 
the Legislature has failed to anticipate a problem, the DCC pro-
vides for the application of common law and equitable princi-
ples.IIl86 By this reading, section 1-103 authorizes the use of ex-
tra-Code law to resolve a problem where the legislature did not 
anticipate the problem. Finding that the legislature did not ad-
dress the issue at hand,187 the court applied extra-Code law. 
In Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine CO./88 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal used section 1-103 to justify an estoppel ex-
ception to the Code's statute of frauds for the sale of goods 
under section 2_201.189 Section 2-201 generally requires that a 
184. T & 0 Mobile Homes, 40 Cal. 3d at 452, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 632. 
185. [d. at 455, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 634. 
186. [d. at 452, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 632. 
187. [d. at 451, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 632. 
188. 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1988). 
189. U.C.C. § 2-201 is the Code's statute of frauds for the sale of goods. It provides: 
§ 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for 
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforce-
able by way of action or defense unless there is some writing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A 
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states 
a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under 
this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such 
writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in 
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender 
is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its 
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against 
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is 
given within 10 days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of sub-
section (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the 
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary 
course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of 
repudiation is received and under circumstances which reason-
ably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either 
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contract for sale of goods must be evidenced by a writing signed 
by the party to be charged, subject to express statutory excep-
tions for part performance (e.g., seller has delivered and buyer 
has accepted goods) and specially manufactured goods. In Allied 
Grape Growers, defendant had orally agreed to purchase grapes 
from plaintiff but later repudiated.190 In reliance on defendant's 
promise to buy, plaintiff cancelled a contract to sell to another 
buyer. When defendant repudiated, plaintiff suffered a loss on 
resale. The court held that the trial court could properly have 
enforced defendant's oral promise under the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel, even though section 2-201 does not expressly pro-
vide such a basis of enforcement.191 
The court invoked section 1-103 as intra-Code authority to 
import the principle of promissory estoppel into section 2_201.192 
According to the court's paraphrase of section 1-103, principles 
of law and equity "not otherwise covered by the Code shall sup-
plement the Code's provisions."19s Borrowing from Professors 
White and Summers for additional authority, the court reasoned 
that it is inconsistent with the general Code requirement of good 
faith under section 1-203 to permit one party to mislead another 
and then plead the statute of frauds. 194 Section 1-103 thus pro-
vided the theoretical means for importing the estoppel principle 
from outside law into the Code's statute of frauds, and section 1-
203 was used to prove that such an interpretation of the statute 
of frauds is consistent with Code principles. 
In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings and 
a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments 
for their procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought ad-
mits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a 
contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable 
under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; 
or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been 
made and accepted or which have been received and accepted 
(Sec. 2-606). 
The California version is the same as V.C.C. § 2-201, except that California did not adopt 
V.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b). CAL. COM. CODE § 2201. 
190. Allied Grape Growers, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 444, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79. 
191. Id. at 444-45, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 879. 
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Loan Association/91S the Ninth Circuit, interpreting New York 
law, used section 1-103 to create a restitutionary exception to 
the final payment rule under section 3_418.198 The latter section 
provides in relevant part that "payment or acceptance of any 
instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course." In Mor-
gan Guaranty Trust, plaintiff mistakenly made provisional set-
tlement (i.e., payment on two notes) to the agent of defendant, 
then mistakenly failed to make timely revocation of settle-
ment.197 These facts prompt the application of the final payment 
rule of section 3_418.198 Application of the final payment rule 
would make plaintiff's payment final in favor of defendant so 
that the matter could not be reopened by plaintiff on the ground 
that plaintiff's payment had been mistaken. On the other hand, 
ignoring the effect of section 3-418, under extra-Code case law in 
New York a payor is allowed an equitable restitutionary remedy 
where it would be unfair to allow a payee to retain a windfall 
resulting from the payor's mistake.199 On the facts of Morgan 
Guaranty Trust, New York's right of restitution would arguably 
allow plaintiff to recover on the grounds of mistaken payment. 
The Ninth Circuit held that in New York the extra-Code right 
of restitution is an exception to section 3-418.200 
The Ninth Circuit in Morgan Guaranty Trust introduced a 
further factor into its analysis: whether section 3-418 has "dis-
placed" the New York restitutionary remedy for mistaken pay-
ment. Such an inquiry is necessary because section 1-103 will 
not import outside law where the relevant Code provision has 
"displaced" the outside law. Specifically, if section 3-418 has dis-
placed the New York right of restitution for mistaken payment, 
then section 1-103 will not import such right of restitution as an 
exception to section 3-418. The Ninth Circuit in Morgan Guar-
195. 804 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 482 U.S. 929 (1987). 
196. Section 3-418 of the New York Commercial Code is identical to U.C.C. § 3-418. 
See U.C.C. § 3-418, supra note 15I. 
197. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 804 F.2d at 1490, 1493. 
198. [d. at 1495. 
199. See, e.g., Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y. 2d 415, 334 
N.Y.S. 2d 388 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829 (1973); In re Leland Fox & John Mur-
phy, Inc., 490 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (1985); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Diamond, 17 Misc. 2d 
909, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 917 (Sup. 1959); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Bank of Commerce, 74 
Misc. 2d 195, 343 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973). None of these cases involve 
the mistaken payment of notes that is at issue in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. case. 
200. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 804 F.2d at 1496. 
49
Foss: Commercial Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
78 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:29 
anty Trust approached the question of displacement by asking 
whether the final payment rule of section 3-418 was intended to 
ban the application of the New York restitutionary remedy.201 
The court determined from the Official Comments202 that the 
rule is intended to apply when the payee is an innocent party 
and thus has a legitimate expectation of finality upon receipt of 
payment. On the facts of Morgan Guaranty Trust the payee 
knew it was not entitled to payment and therefore had no legiti-
mate expectation of closing the transaction. Therefore, on the 
facts of Morgan Guaranty Trust the final payment rule is not 
intended to apply and cannot ban the app~ication of the New 
York restitutionary remedy. Another reason for the inapplicabil-
ity of the final payment rule is that the maker of the note had 
declared bankruptcy. In the usual application of the final pay-
ment rule the payor at least has a present right to recover 
against the maker or drawer of the instrument, but here the 
payor's said right was cut off by the bankruptcy of the maker.203 
Because the final payment rule was not intended to apply to the 
facts of Morgan Guaranty Trust, the final payment rule did not 
displace the New York restitutionary remedy; and under section 
1-103 that remedy applied.204 
201. [d. at 1495. The court there stated that its "inquiry is whether 3-418 was in-
tended to bar a restitutionary remedy to a payor bank against a holder in due course 
that had knowledge of the bankruptcy of the maker at the time the instrument was 
presented. " 
202. [d. at 1495. Official Comment 1 to § 3-418 indicates that the final payment rule 
is limited to the situation where the parties believe the payment to be rightful. In such a 
situation, the benefits of not upsetting the innocent payee's expectations after the payor 
has made payment, as well as not upsetting any subsequent transactions based on that 
payment, outweigh the benefits of reopening the transaction. Official Comment 1 to § 3-
418 provides in part: 
1. The section follows the rule of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 
(1762), under which a drawee who accepts or pays an instru-
ment on which the signature of the drawer is forged is bound 
on his acceptance and cannot recover back his payment. Al-
though the original Act is silent as to payment, the common 
law rule has been applied to it by all but a very few jurisdic-
tions. The traditional justification for the result is that the 
drawee is in a superior position to detect a forgery because he 
has the maker's signature and is expected to know and com-
pare it; a less fictional rationalization is that it is highly de-
sirable to end the transaction on an instrument when it is 
paid rather than reopen and upset a series of commercial 
transactions at a later date when the forgery is discovered. 
[Emphasis added]. 
203. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 804 F.2d at 1496. 
204. [d. 
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In In re Pacific Trencher & Equipment, Inc. 20 r. the Ninth 
Circuit took a different approach to determining whether a Code 
provision explicitly displaces non-Code law. It emphasized the 
specificity of the Code provision. In Pacific Trencher the issue 
was whether a secured party could use the doctrine of reforma-
tion based on mistake where it had inadvertently filed a termi-
nation of its security interest even though it intended to file a 
continuation of the security interest. The court held that the 
provisions of section 9-402(8),206 providing that the financing 
statement can be effective "even though it contains minor errors 
which are not seriously misleading," were sufficiently specific to 
constitute a displacement of the doctrines of mistake and refor-
mation.207 Hence, those extra-Code doctrines were not available 
and the security interest was terminated because the erroneous 
termination was seriously misleading under section 9-402(8).208 
Another example of the use of section 1-103 to import 
outside law is Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp.209 
There the issue was whether a claim based on principles of un-
just enrichment could reverse the priorities which would other-
wise be dictated by Article 9 of the Code.210 In Producers Cotton 
Oil a properly perfected secured party would otherwise have 
been entitled to priority in the proceeds of a crop over the buyer 
of the crop. However, the California Court of Appeal reversed 
this result by application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment.2l1 
The opinion mentions section 1-103,212 but it does not address 
the issue of whether the Code priority scheme displaces the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment. 
205. 735 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1984). 
206. U.C.C. § 9-402(8), supra note 121. 
207. Pacific Trencher, 735 F.2d at 364. 
208. [d. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel previously decided this case in part ac-
cording to purpose reasoning. The court held that the doctrines of reformation and mis-
take were not available because their application to these facts would contradict the fun-
damental purpose of Article 9, i.e., to promote certainty in secured transactions. In re 
Pacific Trencher 27 B.R. 167, 170 (9th Cir. BAP 1983). 
209. 197 Cal. App. 3d 638, 242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1988). 
210. [d. at 659, 242 Cal. Rptr. 927. 
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C. METHODOLOGY UNCLEAR 
1. Interpretation by Fiat 
Some decisions resort to interpretation by pronouncement. 
These cases are not expressly reasoned from intra-Code sources 
or from extra-Code principles. Their methodology is hidden. An 
example of such a decision is In re Kirkland,213 in which the 
court interpreted the anti-waiver provisions of sections 9-501(3) 
and 9-504(3).214 Section 9-501(3) prohibits pre-default waivers. 
Section 9-504(3), although generally requiring the secured party 
to notify the debtor of the sale of collateral, excuses such notice 
if the debtor has signed a waiver of notice "after default." On 
their face these provisions do not seem to need interpretation. It 
is only necessary to know whether the debtor waived its right 
prior to default or after default in order to decide the validity of 
such a waiver. However, in Kirkland the United States Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit was required to ap-
ply these provisions to an unusual set of facts. The following 
simplified version of the facts raises the issue. The debtor had 
defaulted three times. After each of the first two defaults the 
secured party worked out an arrangement with the debtor to 
grant an extension of time to pay, and the debtor purposely re-
nounced any right to notice of sale of the collateral. At no time 
following the third default did the debtor renounce its right to 
notice of sale.2111 The question raised by these facts is whether 
the debtor had waived notice of sale "after default" as required 
by section 9-504(3) or whether the debtor waived notice before 
default as prohibited by section 9-501(3).216 One interpretation 
is that the debtor's waiver of notice, because it came after each 
of the first two defaults, satisfied the requirement that a waiver 
213. 91 B.R. 551 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). 
214. V.C.C. § 9-501(3), supra note 30; V.C.C. § 9-504(3), supra note 29. 
215. Kirkland, 91 B.R. at 552-53. 
216. Kirkland is further complicated because the bankrupts were not debtors. They 
were guarantors who had given collateral for their obligation and had waived notice of 
sale after the debtor's initial defaults but before the debtor's final default. However, the 
guarantors were treated as standing in the shoes of the debtor. Therefore, the issue re-
mained the same for both the guarantors and the debtor.· If the debtor's third default 
was the relevant default, then neither the debtor nor the guarantors had waived the 
notice of sale after default. If the first or second default was the relevant event, then 
they had waived notice of sale after default. The parties admitted this by agreeing that 
the debtor's default was the event that determined whether a waiver of notice of sale by 
the guarantor was after default. [d. at 553. 
52
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss1/6
1990] COMMERCIAL LAW 81 
of the right to notice of sale must be "after default". Another 
interpretation is that because the waiver came prior to the third 
default, it was not an effective waiver. The court held that there 
was no effective waiver after the third default, and therefore the 
secured party still was required to give notice of sale.217 It is not 
explained why the court interpreted the "after default" require-
ment to mean "after the last default." 
Another example of such a 'failure to explain reasoning 
arises in Northern Trust Co. v. Community Bank218 with regard 
to the possible requirement of presentment of documents under 
a letter of credit to a confirming bank where the beneficiary 
seeks to hold the confirming bank liable.219 In Northern Trust, 
the letter of credit required presentment of certain documents 
to the issuer but did not mention presentment to the confirming 
bank.220 Section 5-107(2) provides that a confirming bank is not 
only obligated on the letter of credit, but also "acquires the 
rights of an issuer."221 In Northern Trust, the ambiguity to be 
resolved was whether the defendant confirming bank, in acquir-
ing the rights of an issuer pursuant to section 5-107(2), had ac-
quired the right of the issuer under the letter of credit to receive 
proper presentment of the documents as a pre-condition to pay-
ment. The Ninth Circuit held that, in the absence of a contrac-
tual agreement, independent presentment of documents to a 
confirming bank is not required.222 The court gave no explana-
tion as to the methodology or reasoning it used to reach that 
result.223 
217. [d. at 555. 
218. 873 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1989). 
219. A confirming bank is by definition a bank that has engaged to honor another 
issuer's letter of credit. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f) provides: 
(f) A "confirming bank" is a bank which engages either that it 
will itself honor a credit already issued by another bank or 
that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third 
bank. 
220. Northern Trust, 873 F.2d at 228. Under U.C.C. § 5-114(1) the issuer's liability 
would arise upon proper presentment to it of the documents specified in the letter of 
credit. 
221. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) provides: 
(2) A confirming bank by confirming a credit becomes directly 
obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as 
though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of an issuer. 
222. Northern Trust, 873 F.2d at 229. 
223. The court cited to H. HARFIELD. BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES, 324-25 (5th 
ed. 1974), evidently because a form provided therein allows the parties to specify inde-
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2. Case Law Citation Without Further Reasoning 
These decisions are not expressly reasoned according to in-
tra-Code policies or provisions nor extra-Code law. They simply 
purport to follow case law precedent. The court does not disclose 
its interpretive reasoning. 
An example of a decision following case law precedent with-
out explaining its reasoning is Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc.,224 
which dealt with the previously discussed issue of whether a 
guarantor is to be treated as a debtor under section 9-501(3) in 
order to receive that provision's protection from pre-default 
waiver.2211 Unlike the other courts that considered whether a 
guarantor should be treated as a debtor for purposes of this pro-
vision and the other debtor-protective provisions of Article 9,226 
this court did not disclose its reasoning. It simply cited one case 
- a minority position - decided in another jurisdiction.227 
A similar resort to case authority without reasoning can be 
found in Kirby v. Palos Verdes Escrow CO.228 which interprets 
section 9-318(3).229 Where a debt is assigned, section 9-318(3) 
protects the debtor if the debtor pays the assignor (Le. original 
pendent presentment to the confirming bank. Id. From this thin reed the court deter· 
mined that independent presentment is not required without a contractual agreement by 
the parties. 
224. 173 Cal. App. 3d 965, 219 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1985). 
225. U.C.C. § 9·501(3), supra note 30. 
226. See supra notes 28·36 and accompanying text. 
227. Rutan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 973,219 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The authority cited was 
U.S. v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Such a resort to minority case law not 
only hides reasoning, but also would seem inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of 
the Code stated in U.C.C. § 1·102(2)(c) "to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions." Indeed, to the extent case law from other jurisdictions is a valid basis for 
interpreting the Code, § 1·102(2)(c) indicates the opposite interpretation in this case 
because the weight of authority has held that a guarantor is a debtor. See cases collected 
in Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 399. 
228. 183 Cal. App. 3d 57, 227 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1986). 
229. U.C.C. § 9·318(3) provides: 
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until 
the account debtor receives notification that the amount due 
or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be 
made to the assignee. A notification which does not reasonably 
identify the rights assigned is ineffective. If requested by the 
account debtor, the assignee must seasonably furnish reason· 
able proof that the assignment has been made and unless he 
does so the account debtor may pay the assignor. 
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creditor) before receiving notice of the assignment. This provi-
sion authorizes the debtor to pay the assignor "until the ... 
debtor receives notification that the amount due or to become 
due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the 
assignee." There is no resolution of whether the notice required 
is actual notice rather than constructive notice. In Kirby, the 
question was whether constructive notice imparted by recorda-
tion of an assignment of a note and deed of trust was sufficient 
to inform a debtor of the assignment and thereby require the 
debtor to pay the assignee. Based entirely on an appeal to case 
law precedent, the court held that actual notice, not constructive 
notice, is required.230 
Another example of the use of case-law precedent is the de-
cision in Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp.231 The court 
addressed the issue, also addressed in In Re Ellsworth,232 of 
whether a debtor's sale of collateral can be deemed authorized 
under section 9-306(2)233 by the secured party's past conduct. If 
so, the secured party's interest cannot be carried forward against 
the third party buyer under section 9-306(2). The Court of Ap-
peal relied on case authority234 but not reasoning to hold that 
the secured party's past conduct in dispensing with contractu-
ally required written consent for the debtor's sales of collateral 
constituted an effective authorization for a subsequent sale 
under the "or otherwise" provision of section 9-306(2).236 
230. Kirby, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 788. 
231. 197 Cal. App. 3d 638, 242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1988). 
232. See Ellsworth, supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
233. U.C.C. § 9-306(2), supra note 44. 
234. Producers Cotton Oil, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 242 Cal. Rptr. 918. The author-
ity cited was Central Cal. Equip. Co. v. Dolk Tractor Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d 855, 144 Cal. 
Rptr. 367 (1978). 
235. Producers Cotton Oil, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 242 Cal. Rptr. 918. Another 
example of the case law approach can be found in Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corp. v. 
Miller Mining Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1424 (1987), where the court interpreted the "commer-
cially reasonable" sale requirement of U.C.C. § 9-504(3). Under that provision a foreclos-
ing secured party may sell collateral, but every aspect of the sale must be "commercially 
reasonable". The Ninth Circuit used a case law approach to interpretation instead of 
reasoning from policies and principles found within the Code. The court determined, 
based on case law precedent, that the factors indicating that a sale is not "commercially 
reasonable" include the secured party's failure to prepare collateral for resale, failure to 
maintain the collateral, and gross inadequacy of price. Because plaintiff had failed all of 
these standards, the court held that it had not conducted the sale in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 817 F.2d at 1427-28. 
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III. APPLYING THE METHODOLOGIES 
A. CRITICISM OF CASE LAW METHODOLOGY 
The case law reviewed herein has not articulated consistent 
guidelines as to how to reason under intra-Code methodology, 
how to reason under extra-Code methodology, and how to 
choose which methodology to employ. Those cases interpreting 
Code provisions without any reasoning at all contribute nothing 
toward creating such guidelines.238 Almost as unhelpful in this 
endeavor is an interpretation justified by citations to case law 
without explanation of why those past interpretations by other 
courts are justified on the facts of the present case.237 Even 
where the interpretive result is justifiable in the present case, an 
unexplained methodology offers no guidance for interpreting the 
relevant Code provision in future cases. Futhermore, interpreta-
tion without methodological explanation offers no guidance for 
interpreting Code provisions generally. Such cases represent lost 
opportunities to de-mystify the interpretive process. 
Another class of cases that fail to de-mystify are those that 
decide whether to apply extra-Code law without even discussing 
section 1-103. For example, in the Fundin case the issue was 
whether to apply an extra-Code statute of limitations instead of 
section 2-725.238 In Nunes Turfgrass the issue was whether to 
apply a non-Code rule regarding waiver of liability.239 In the Di-
amond Fruit Growers case the issue was whether to apply the 
common law "last-shot principle" to determine the terms of a 
contract.240 Yet, in none of those cases was section 1-103 even 
mentioned. Although it is possible to reach a justifiable result 
regarding the application of non-Code law without invoking sec-
tion 1-103, a proper result would be more likely if reached in 
accordance with the requirements of section 1-103. Furthermore, 
236. See, e.g., In re Kirkland, supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text; Northern 
Trust Co. v. Community Bank, supra notes 218-223 and accompanying text. 
237. See, e.g., Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc., supra notes 224-227 and accompanying 
text; Kirby v. Palos Verdes Escrow Co., supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text; 
Producers Cotton Oil v. Amstar Corp., supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text. 
238. See discussion of Fundin supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text. 
239. See discussion of Nunes Turgrass, supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. 
240. See discussion of Diamond Fruit Growers, supra notes 90-94 and accompany-
ing text. 
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the considered, articulated exploration of that section in as 
many contexts as possible would lead to a better understanding 
of how to use extra-Code methodology and whether to do so. 
Even decisions that have articulated extra-Code methodol-
ogy have failed to establish adequate guidelines for the use of 
that methodology and for the choice between methodologies. For 
example, the decisions that have discussed section 1-103 have 
not created a consistent and useful standard for determining 
whether an extra-Code principle is "displaced by the particular 
provisions" of the Code. Such a standard is crucial because ac-
cording to section 1-103 extra-Code principles are not available 
where they have been displaced. For example, in the Producers 
Cotton Oil case, on authority of section 1-103 the court imported 
the extra-Code doctrines of unjust enrichment and quasi-con-
tract to alter the normal Code priority scheme but did not ex-
plain why such doctrines were not displaced by the Code secur-
ity provisions. 241 The same criticism may be made of the Allied 
Grape Growers case, wherein the court used the extra-Code doc-
trine of promissory estoppel to supplement the Code statute of 
frauds but did not expressly address the issue of whether the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel was displaced by the Code's 
statute of frauds. 242 
The Allied Grape Growers opinion does, however, provide 
by inference a standard for determining when extra-Code law is 
not displaced by a Code provision. The court stated that under 
section 1-103 the principles of law and equity "not otherwise 
covered by the Code" shall supplement the Code's provisions.243 
This reading of the section likely means that where the Code 
does not cover a matter, the Code does not displace extra-Code 
principles. Thus a possible standard for the displacement issue 
appears to be whether the Code covers the issue at hand. The 
California Supreme Court in T & 0 Mobile Homes,w although 
241. See Producers Cotton Oil Co. v. Amstar Corp., supra notes 209-212 and accom-
panying text; see also E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. City National Bank, 149 Cal. App. 3d 
60, 69, 196 Cal. Rptr. 614, 620 (1983) (raises displacement issue but does not explain its 
conclusion that no provision of U.C.C. displaces tort negligence theory). 
242. See discussion of Allied Grape Growers, supra notes 188-194 and accompany-
ing text. 
243. Allied Grape Growers, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 442, 249 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1988). 
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not holding specifically on the matter, provides a similar stan-
dard in its paraphrase of section 1-103. According to this court, 
extra-Code law is available under section 1-103 where the legis-
lature has failed to anticipate a problem.2' 6 Presumably then, 
where the legislature has left a gap in the coverage of the Code, 
extra-Code law is not displaced and may supplement the Code. 
A standard for displacement based on whether the Code 
covers or overlooks the matter at hand is as uncertain as the 
displacement issue it seeks to clarify. We are left with no relia-
ble way to know whether the Code covers or overlooks the issue. 
The unreliability of such a standard is exemplified by the court's 
inept application of it in the T & 0 Mobile Homes case. There 
the California Supreme Court concluded that the legislature had 
not anticipated the problem of a filing officer's oversight as it 
applies to a subsequent buyer of a mobile home.Z' 6 Yet this con-
clusion is highly debatable in light of the Code comment that 
the secured party does not bear the risk of a filing officer's over-
sightz•7 and in light of the provision of California Vehicle Code 
section 6301 that "the rights of all persons in the vehicle shall be 
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code."z46 
In re Pacific Trencher & Equipment, Inc. has the virtue of 
expressly addressing the issue of displacement and expressly de-
fining a standard.z•e In this sense, its methodology is better than 
the previous two cases. However, the standard defined is no 
more useful. In Pacific Trencher the court stressed the specific-
ity of the relevant Code provisions in holding that they dis-
placed the common law principles of reformation and mistake.260 
However, such an approach is no more workable than the "cov-
erage" approach. Still lacking is a reliable standard for deter-
mining when a Code provision is specific enough to displace an 
extra-Code principle, or when a Code provision is to be labeled 
specific or non-specific. 
245. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
246. See supra note 187. 
247. See Official Comment 1 to D.C.C. § 9-407, supra note 183. 
248. CAL. VEH. CODE § 6301. This statute is cited by the dissent in T & 0 Mobile 
Homes, 40 Cal. 3d at 459, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 637. 
249. See discussion of Pacific Trencher, supra notes 205-208 and accompanying 
text. 
250. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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Courts have not always used intra-Code methodology prop-
erly either. Sometimes courts have made the methodological 
mistake of ignoring or de-emphasizing purpose reasoning while 
relying on other intra-Code interpretive techniques. A court 
might use the technique of interpreting one Code provision 
based on implication from other Code provisions without consid-
ering whether the resulting interpretation violates the purpose 
of the interpreted provision. By way of example, in the Farmers 
& Merchants State Bank case the court reasoned based on im-
plications from other Code provisions that section 3-418 super-
sedes section 4-213(1).2Iil However, there is a contrary indication 
in section 4-102(1), which provides that the provisions of Article 
4 govern those of Article 3.2112 Given the uncertainty created by 
this conflict in implications, the court should have considered 
whether its result is consistent with the relevant purposes. 
Similarly, where a court uses the technique of reasoning by 
analogy, it is methodologically mistaken not to consider whether 
the principles involved would be offended by drawing such an 
analogy. For example, in Bank of the West, the court deter-
mined that a transaction between subsidiaries was sufficiently 
like a change of structure to invoke the change-of-structure pro-
vision of section 9-402(7).21i3 However, such reasoning' is only 
valid if the purpose of the change-of-structure provision is con-
sistent with its application to the transaction in Bank of the 
West. The court failed to make that determination, at least 
expressly.2114 
Failure to consider the purpose of a provision is a method-
ological lapse that can readily lead to misinterpretation. In Wil-
son v. Steel,2IiIi for example, the court misapplied section 3-
251. See discussion of Farmers & Merchants State Bank, supra notes 147-158 and 
accompanying text. 
252. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also V.C.C. § 4-102(1). 
253. See supra 159-164 and accompanying text. 
254. In Bank of the West the court did not articulate purpose reasoning on the issue 
of whether a transfer between two commonly owned subsidiaries constitutes a change of 
structure under V.C.C. § 9-402(7). However, the court did state that such a "transaction 
has the same effect as a merger of the transferor into the transferee with the transferee 
as the surviving corporation .... " 852 F.2d at 1162. From this premise, the court might 
have impliedly reasoned that whatever the purpose of the change-of-structure provision 
might be, that purpose must be satisfied by its application to this merger-like 
transaction. 
255. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 259 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1989). 
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305(2)(b)2118 by ignoring its purpose. That section provides that a 
holder in due course, although not normally subject to contract 
defenses, is subject to the defense that the transaction giving 
rise to the instrument was illegal to the point of rendering the 
underlying obligation a "nullity." In Wilson the illegality was 
that the instrument had been issued to an unlicensed contractor 
in payment for contracting services.2117 The court concluded that 
the obligation was a "nullity" because this particular illegality 
rendered the obligation unenforceable under local law.2118 Thus 
the court evidently interpreted "nullity" to mean "unenforce-
able," so that an obligation is a nullity when it is unenforceable. 
Yet the purpose of Section 3-305(2)(b) indicates a different in-
terpretation of nullity. The section is designed to permit only 
the most severe types of illegality to be asserted against a holder 
256. U.C.C. § 3-305 provides: 
§ 3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course. 
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes 
the instrument free from 
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and 
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the 
holder has not dealt except 
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple 
contract; and 
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the 
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; 
and 
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to 
sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable op-
portunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential 
terms; and 
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and 
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice 
when he takes the instrument. 
257. Actually, it is only assumed for purposes of discussion in Wilson that the note 
was issued in payment for contracting services. The lower court had failed to determine 
the reason for which the note had been issued. The Court of Appeal remanded for a 
determination of this factual question. 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1063-64, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 
856-57. 
258. Wilson, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1059-60. 259 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The court based its 
holding that the obligation was unenforceable on CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 which 
provides in part: 
No person engaged in the business of acting in the capacity of 
a contractor, may bring or maintain any action ... in any 
court of this state for the collection of compensation for the 
performance of any act or contract for which a license is re-
quired by this chapter without alleging and proving that he 
... was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the per-
formance of that act or contract .... 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031. 
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in due course.2119 Therefore, the unenforceability that normally 
accompanies an illegal transaction should not automatically 
render the obligation a nullity. Instead, the purpose of the sec-
tion indicates that an illegality should render the obligation a 
nullity only when the illegality is so severe as to be strongly vio-
lative of public policy.260 Because the contracts of an unlicensed 
contractor have been held by the California courts to be only 
malum prohibitum, not malum in se,261 the illegality in Wilson 
is not sufficiently grave to render the obligation a nullity under 
California law. Consequently, in this case, the purpose of section 
3-305(2)(b) indicates that the licensing illegality should not be 
assertable against a holder in due course. By ignoring this pur-
pose, the court misinterpreted the meaning of nullity and misap-
plied the relevant section. 
Even where courts have expressly considered the purpose of 
a provision, they have sometimes erred because they misunder-
stood that purpose and therefore misinterpreted or misapplied 
the provision. For example, in Shooting Star Enterprises, the 
court interpreted the term proceeds under section 9-306 to ex-
clude payment for a so-called equity portion of collateral (i.e., 
that portion of the value of the collateral supposedly not needed 
by the secured party because it exceeded the amount of the 
debt) sold by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.262 The court 
based its holding on a perceived policy to avoid double recovery 
by the secured party.263 The result might be questioned because 
the primary purpose of section 9-306(2) is to give the secured 
259. Official Comment 5 to V.C.C. § 3·305 provides with respect to illegality that 
"Ii]f under the local law the effect is to render the obligation of the instrument entirely 
null and void, the defense may be asserted against a holder in due course. If the effect is 
merely to render the obligation voidable at the election of the obligor, the defense is cut 
off." The requirement that the illegality must render the obligation "entirely null and 
void" under local law indicates a policy that only the most severe illegality may be as· 
serted as a defense against a holder in due course. 
260. See, e.g., Pacific National Bank v. Hernreich, 220 Ark. 114, 398 S.W. 2d 221 
(1966). 
261. See, e.g., Steinwinter v. Maxwell, 183 Cal. App. 2d 34, 39, 6 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 
(1960); S & Q Constr. Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization, 179 Cal. App. 2d 
364,367,3 Cal. Rptr .. 690, 692 (1960). Both cases held that an unlicensed contractor may 
assert a set· off based on a contract for building services emphasized that the set·off was 
justified because an unlicensed contractor's illegality is only malum prohibitum, not ma-
lum in se. 
262. See supra notes 43·46 and accompanying text. 
263. The source of the policy on which the court relied was Official Comment 3 to 
U.C.C. § 9·306, supra note 46. 
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party the right to look to both proceeds and collateral. 264 That 
purpose is thwarted by denying the secured party the right to 
the payment for the equity portion of collateral because the se-
cured party is then left to look only to the remaining collateral. 
The way to accommodate both policies is to interpret the pay-
ment to constitute proceeds, thus continuing the security inter-
est in the payment, but to limit the secured party's recovery 
from the collateral so that he is not overpaid. 
The purposes underlying a provision may conflict, and when 
this happens courts utilizing purpose reasoning have an espe-
cially difficult task. The possibility of conflicting purposes does 
not constitute a methodological mistake by the courts. Rather, it 
is simply a complication inherent in purpose reasoning. For ex-
ample, the conflicting purposes underlying the California version 
of section 5-114, prohibiting courts from enjoining the honor of a 
letter of credit, led two courts to disagree on the question of 
whether that provision, while concededly preventing the issuer 
from being enjoined, also prohibits enjoining the beneficiary. 2M 
The Mitsui Manufacturers Bank court, by emphasizing the pol-
icy of keeping the issuer independent of the underlying transac-
tion, permitted an injunction of the beneficiary because en-
joining the beneficiary would not offend a policy aimed at 
protecting the issuer. 266 On the other hand, the Trans Meridian 
Trading court, by emphasizing the policy in favor of honoring 
letters of credit, did not permit an injunction of the beneficiary 
because that policy would be offended by such injunction.267 
Both courts used a valid methodological approach notwithstand-
ing their opposite results. The remaining question that will have 
to be decided when courts are faced with the issue of enjoining 
the beneficiary is which policy is more compelling on the facts of 
the case at hand. 
A final pitfall in purpose reasoning is the possibility that a 
court might invent a purpose in order to achieve a desired inter-
264. Official Comment 3 to v.c.c. § 9-306 provides that the "secured party may 
claim both proceeds and collateral, but may of course have only one satisfaction." [Em-
phasis added]. See supra note 46. 
265. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. 
266. See discussion of Mitsui Manufacturers Bank, supra notes 63-66 and accompa-
nying text. 
267. See discussion of Trans Meridian Trading, supra notes 67-71 and accompany-
ing text. 
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pretation. In order to avoid the problem of result-oriented pur-
pose reasoning, courts must document the source .of the purpose 
on which they rely. No obvious examples of disingenuous rea-
soning were found in the cases reviewed. However, in FDIC v. 
Bank of San Francisco, where the court relied on the Article 5 
policy of guaranteeing assured payment to a beneficiary in order 
to interpret the phrase "fraud in the transaction" under section 
5-114(2)(b), the court did not document the source of the pol-
icy.268 The case is therefore wrong in form, although correct in 
substance because such documentation is readily available 
within the Code.269 
B. SUGGESTED METHODOLOGICAL ApPROACH 
The purposes and policies underlying a Code provision may 
not be contradicted or defied by its interpretation regardless of 
which methodology is applied. Such underlying purposes and 
policies include not only those of the provision to be interpreted 
but also those of the relevant Article and of the Code itself. Sub-
ject to this restriction, courts should be free to choose either in-
tra-Code methodology or extra-Code methodology.27o If a court 
employs intra-Code techniques such as applying other Code sec-
tions, the resulting interpretation must be consistent with the 
268. See discussion of FDIC v. Bank San Francisco, supra notes 38-42 accompany-
ing text. 
269. The policy in favor of assured payment on letters of credit regardless of the 
underlying business deal is evidenced in Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 5-114, which 
provides in part: 
In view of [the) independent nature of the letter of credit en-
gagement, the issuer is under a duty to honor the drafts or 
demands for payment which in fact comply with the terms of 
the credit without reference to their compliance with the 
terms of the underlying contract .... The duty of the issuer to 
honor where there is factual compliance with the terms of the 
credit is also independent of any instructions from its cus-
tomer once the credit has been issued and received by the 
beneficiary. 
270. See Hillman supra note 26. Professor Nickles has suggested that courts should 
be allowed to use either extra-Code or intra-Code methodology, at the court's option, on 
condition that the interpretation so achieved is consistent with the underlying Code purf 
poses expressed in U.C.C. § 1-102{2}. See Nickles, supra note 26. The approach suggested 
herein differs in that the purposes underlying individual Code provisions are entitled to 
the same dignity that Professor Nickles has granted to Code-wide purposes. In effect, the 
approach suggested herein subordinates other techniques to purpose reasoning, and ele-
vates that aspect of intra-Code methodology above other forms of intra-Code methodol-
ogy and above extra-Code methodology. 
63
Foss: Commercial Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
92 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:29 
relevant purposes and policies. If a court uses extra-Code meth-
odology, the application of extra-Code law must not create an 
interpretive result in conflict with the purpose of the relevant 
Code provision. 
As a first step a court must therefore determine and docu-
ment the purposes and policies underlying the interpreted Code 
provision. Where such purposes and policies affirmatively re-
quire an interpretation, that interpretation should be adopted 
without resort to further interpretive techniques. In fact, even 
where the ordinary meaning of the language of the provision in-
dicates a different result from that suggested by the purpose, the 
latter should prevail. Thus, the Great Southwest Life case cor-
rectly held that a co-maker is not entitled to discharge under 
section 3-606(1)(b), despite the language of that section stating 
that "any party" to an instrument is entitled to be discharged 
thereunder, because the purpose of the provision indicates that 
it actually refers to any party except a co-maker.271 
Under the suggested methodology, the issue of pre-default 
waiver in the Kirkland case272 would be resolved according to 
this first step. The purpose of the section 9-501(3) prohibition 
against a debtor's pre-default waiver of rights is to safeguard the 
vulnerable debtor's post-default rights from pre-default over-
reaching by the secured party.27S The facts of Kirkland are pre-
cisely those at which this purpose is directed. The debtor de-
faulted twice, and as the price for renegotiating its loan, it had 
no economic choice but to agree to a waiver of notice of sale. 
Subsequently, upon a third default, it would contravene the 
debtor-protective purpose of section 9-501(3) to deny the debtor, 
271. See discussion of Great Southwest Life, supra notes 80-83 and accompanying 
text. 
272. See discussion of Kirkland, supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text. 
273. The purpose of the prohibition against a debtor's pre-default waiver of rights is 
disclosed in Official Comment 4 to v.c.c. § 9-501, which provides in part: 
In the area of rights after default our legal system has tradi-
tionally looked with suspicion on agreements designed to cut 
down the debtor's rights and free the secured party of his du-
ties .... The default situation offers great scope for over-
reaching; the suspicious attitude of the courts has been 
grounded in common sense. 
Subsection (3) of this section contains a codification of this 
long-standing and deeply rooted attitude: the specified rights 
of the debtor ... may not be waived ... except as stated. 
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or the guarantors standing in the debtor's shoes, the protections 
of section 9-501(3) by holding that they had waived their rights 
post-default. Even though the waiver followed two defaults, the 
interpretation consistent with the purpose of section 9-501(3) is 
to interpret the waiver as a pre-default waiver. 
Where the relevant purposes and policies do not affirma-
tively require a particular result, then as a second step a court 
may proceed to apply intra-Code methodology or extra-Code 
methodology, or both. Assuming that the court uses intra-Code 
methodology, it may interpret according to intra-Code tech-
niques but must determine that the interpretive result so ob-
tained does not conflict with any relevant policies and purposes. 
Thus, the decision. in In re Hawaii Corp. is methodologically 
correct. The court interpreted section 8-207(1) according to in-
ferences drawn from Code provisions (e.g., sections 8-105(3)(c) 
and 8-103(a»274 and also determined that its interpretive result 
was consistent with the relevant purposes.27Ii On the other hand, 
the methodology of the Farmers & Merchants State Bank case 
is incorrect because it reasons from other provisions without 
considering whether the interpretive result so obtained (i.e., that 
the final payment rule of section 3-418 supersedes that of sec-
tion 4-213) conflicts with the relevant purposes as they apply to 
the facts of the case.276 
In the case of extra-Code methodology, tpe court may apply 
whatever extra-Code laws and principles are not inconsistent 
with the relevant purposes and policies. The court must make a 
self-conscious effort to determine that application of an extra-
Code rule will not defy such purposes and policies. An example 
of a decision correctly employing such an approach is the Mor-
gan Guaranty Trust Co. case, where the court adopted an extra-
Code restitutionary remedy as an exception to the final payment 
rule of section 3-418.277 The court carefully examined the situa-
tions to which the final payment rule was intended to apply, de-
termined that it was not intended to apply to the facts of the 
274. See supra notes 137-146 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. 
276. See discussion of Farmers & Merchants State Bank, notes 147-158 and accom-
panying text. 
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case, and therefore held that the intent behind the final pay-
ment rule would not be offended by the creation of an extra-
Code exception to section 3_418.278 Although the court articu-
lated its reasoning in terms of the intended application of the 
final payment rule rather than its purposes and policies,279 the 
result is the same. The court double-checked its extra-Code in-
terpretation to ascertain that the spirit of the final payment rule 
was not violated. 
The relevant purposes and policies can also resolve the ex-
tra-Code methodological issue under section 1-103 of whether 
the Code displaces an extra-Code principle, thereby making the 
extra-Code principle inapplicable. Where the application of an 
extra-Code principle creates an interpretation that is offensive 
to the relevant purposes and policies, the extra-Code principle 
should be deemed to be displaced and therefore inapplicable; 
but where its application to a Code provision is inoffensive to 
the relevant purposes and policies, the extra-Code principle is 
not displaced and can be applied. In this way, the displacement 
language of section 1-103 can be harmonized with the purposes 
underlying Code provisions. 
The foregoing approach still leaves one unresolved situation. 
Assume that the purposes and policies underlying the provision 
to be interpreted do not themselves compel a result. Assume fur-
ther that intra-Code techniques suggest an interpretation differ-
ent from extra-Code techniques. Finally, assume that neither the 
intra-Code interpretation not the extra-Code interpretation vio-
lates the relevant purposes and policies. Under the suggested 
methodological approach, the court is free to use either intra-
Code or extra-Code methodology where neither offends the rele-
vant purposes and policies. In choosing between two inoffensive 
but contrary interpretations, a court should be free to choose the 
more equitable. Although it has been argued that judges may 
generally interpret the Code in this way,280 it is preferable that a 
278. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 804 F.2d at 1495-1496. 
279. [d. at 1495. The court described its inquiry 88 "whether 3-418 was intended to 
bar a restitutionary remedy to a payor bank against a holder in due course that had 
knowledge of the bankruptcy of the maker at the time the instrument was presented." 
See supra note 201. 
280. See Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 906 (1984). 
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judge's generalized concepts of fairness should be determinative 
only in the narrow situation described above. Otherwise, the 
purposes and policies of the legislature as reflected in the Code 
drafting will be overridden. 
An instructive example of the suggested methodology can be 
based on the section 9-306(2) issue of whether a debtor's disposi-
tion of collateral "was authorized by the secured party in the 
security agreement or otherwise," thereby cutting off the secured 
party's rights in the collateraP81 If the security agreement pro-
hibits the debtor from disposing of the collateral, or prohibits 
the debtor from doing so without written permission from the 
secured party, an interpretive issue arises when the secured 
party has created a course of dealing whereby it has previously 
allowed the debtor to sell collateral. On these facts, even though 
the debtor's subsequent disposition is not authorized in the se-
curity agreement, it might be considered authorized "otherwise" 
(i.e., by implication) under section 9-306(2). 
Both the Ellsworth decision and the Producers Cotton Oil 
Co. decision addressed the foregoing interpretive issue, but both 
employed unsatisfactory methodology. Neither court considered 
the purpose behind the "otherwise authorized" provision. Ells-
worth used the intra-Code device of relying on another Code 
provision - section 1-205(4) which states that express contract 
terms govern the course of dealing - to hold no authorization 
under section 9-306(2).282 Even more unsatisfactory, Producers 
Cotton Oil simply cited case authority to reach the opposite re-
sult on the same facts. 283 
The suggested approach would require first that the court 
consider the purpose of section 9-306(2), as well as any relevant 
more general purposes that might resolve the matter. Such an 
inquiry does not reveal any purpose or policy that would directly 
resolve the interpretation of whether, on these facts, the disposi-
tion was "otherwise" authorized under section 9-306(2). There-
fore, as a next step, a court would be free to use intra-Code 
methodology or extra-Code methodology. It could use the intra-
281. V.C.C. § 9-306(2), supra note 44. 
282. See discussion of Ellsworth, supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
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Code device of relying on section 1-205(4) if it determined that 
no relevant purpose or policy is offended thereby. It appears 
that none is. Conversely, a court could use the extra-Code doc-
trines of estoppel or waiver to impose an authorization on the 
secured party based on its conduct. Under this approach the se-
cured party's conduct would estop it from denying it had au-
thorized the disposition, or in the alternative such conduct 
would constitute its waiver of the contract term prohibiting dis-
position without consent. Again it would appear that no relevant 
purpose would be offended thereby even though this result is 
opposite from the intra-Code result. Because both interpreta-
tions are inoffensive to the relevant purposes, the court could 
choose its interpretive method and result based on its sense of 
justice. The facts of the case would therefore become decisive. 
For example, if the buyer of the collateral knew of the restric-
tions on it, that would weigh against an interpretation of section 
9-306(2) cutting off the secured party. If the secured party knew 
of the impending transfer but failed to warn the transferee, that 
would be a factor weighing in favor of an interpretation cutting 
off the secured party. 
Under the proposed approach it is possible that the courts' 
interpretation of whether a disposition was authorized "other-
wise" under section 9-306(2) will vary according to the facts of 
the case. Sometimes a past course of dealing by the secured 
party authorizing dispositions will constitute authorization of a 
subsequent disposition. Sometimes it will not. Furthermore, 
where purposes are not defined, other Code provisions may also 
be subject to different interpretive methodologies and diverse 
interpretations varying with the facts. But this would be the ex-
ception rather than the rule, because the relevant policies pro-
vide the boundaries beyond which interpretation may not go. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Code creates a tension between intra-Code methodol-
ogy and extra-Code methodology. The case law reviewed herein 
does not adequately resolve this methodological dilemma. The 
best way to do so is to recognize purpose reasoning as the pri-
mary interpretive technique. Where that is indecisive, courts 
should flexibly employ other interpretive techniques so long as 
the result is consistent with the relevant purposes and policies. 
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